Capability-Routed Guard: Defending Large Reasoning Models Against Reasoning-Centric Jailbreaks
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 11, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.07892v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large reasoning models (LRMs) expose a new safety failure mode: adversarial prompts can manipulate reasoning context, task decomposition, or capability interpretation so that harmful objectives are processed as legitimate reasoning steps. Existing safeguards, including safety reminders, external classifiers, and self-checking wrappers, are often brittle because they either inspect the adversarial prompt directly or ask the target model to perform a
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 8 Aug 2026]
Capability-Routed Guard: Defending Large Reasoning Models Against Reasoning-Centric Jailbreaks
Yiyong Liu, Yixin Wu, Jun Sakuma
Large reasoning models (LRMs) expose a new safety failure mode: adversarial prompts can manipulate reasoning context, task decomposition, or capability interpretation so that harmful objectives are processed as legitimate reasoning steps. Existing safeguards, including safety reminders, external classifiers, and self-checking wrappers, are often brittle because they either inspect the adversarial prompt directly or ask the target model to perform additional safety reasoning on the same surface that attacks exploit. We introduce Capability-Routed Guard (CRG), a model-agnostic inference-time guardrail for closed-source LRMs, where defenders cannot inspect hidden reasoning traces or modify model weights. CRG reframes prompt defense as a capability-routing problem: a side-channel controller first constructs a trusted representation of the user's authorized task, active context, safety evidence, and capability-transfer risk, separating executable intent from untrusted reasoning context. This representation supports route-specific execution, allowing CRG to block high-risk requests, constrain ambiguous ones, and forward low-risk requests through trusted active context. Finally, CRG applies TraceCheck to verify consistency with the authorized task and invokes a restricted fallback to preserve utility for low-risk benign prompts. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CRG effectively mitigates diverse reasoning-centric jailbreaks while preserving benign utility and avoiding common over-refusal issues. Further analysis shows that its components contribute complementary benefits, highlighting the importance of coordinated defense mechanisms for securing large reasoning models.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.07892 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.07892v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.07892
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Yiyong Liu [view email]
[v1] Sat, 8 Aug 2026 03:40:06 UTC (8,412 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-08
Change to browse by:
cs
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)