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Capability-Routed Guard: Defending Large Reasoning Models Against Reasoning-Centric Jailbreaks

arXiv Security Archived Aug 11, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.07892v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large reasoning models (LRMs) expose a new safety failure mode: adversarial prompts can manipulate reasoning context, task decomposition, or capability interpretation so that harmful objectives are processed as legitimate reasoning steps. Existing safeguards, including safety reminders, external classifiers, and self-checking wrappers, are often brittle because they either inspect the adversarial prompt directly or ask the target model to perform a

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 8 Aug 2026] Capability-Routed Guard: Defending Large Reasoning Models Against Reasoning-Centric Jailbreaks Yiyong Liu, Yixin Wu, Jun Sakuma Large reasoning models (LRMs) expose a new safety failure mode: adversarial prompts can manipulate reasoning context, task decomposition, or capability interpretation so that harmful objectives are processed as legitimate reasoning steps. Existing safeguards, including safety reminders, external classifiers, and self-checking wrappers, are often brittle because they either inspect the adversarial prompt directly or ask the target model to perform additional safety reasoning on the same surface that attacks exploit. We introduce Capability-Routed Guard (CRG), a model-agnostic inference-time guardrail for closed-source LRMs, where defenders cannot inspect hidden reasoning traces or modify model weights. CRG reframes prompt defense as a capability-routing problem: a side-channel controller first constructs a trusted representation of the user's authorized task, active context, safety evidence, and capability-transfer risk, separating executable intent from untrusted reasoning context. This representation supports route-specific execution, allowing CRG to block high-risk requests, constrain ambiguous ones, and forward low-risk requests through trusted active context. Finally, CRG applies TraceCheck to verify consistency with the authorized task and invokes a restricted fallback to preserve utility for low-risk benign prompts. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CRG effectively mitigates diverse reasoning-centric jailbreaks while preserving benign utility and avoiding common over-refusal issues. Further analysis shows that its components contribute complementary benefits, highlighting the importance of coordinated defense mechanisms for securing large reasoning models. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2608.07892 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.07892v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.07892 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Yiyong Liu [view email] [v1] Sat, 8 Aug 2026 03:40:06 UTC (8,412 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 11, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 11, 2026
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