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Adversarial Attacks on Deep OCR Systems

arXiv Security Archived Aug 11, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.07636v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Deep-OCR (DeepSeek-OCR) advances document recognition by treating the visual modality as an optical compression medium, enabling long-context OCR at low token cost. However, its increased complexity may introduce new security vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first pure black-box adversarial attack against a generative OCR vision-language model, where only the decoded string can be queried and no gradient

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 7 Aug 2026] Adversarial Attacks on Deep OCR Systems Wenbo Sun, Hongzong LI, Yanyun Wang, Jiahao MA, Shuxin Zhuang, Rong Feng, Shiqin Tang, Zi Liang Deep-OCR (DeepSeek-OCR) advances document recognition by treating the visual modality as an optical compression medium, enabling long-context OCR at low token cost. However, its increased complexity may introduce new security vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first pure black-box adversarial attack against a generative OCR vision-language model, where only the decoded string can be queried and no gradients, logits, or model internals are available. We recast the attack as a zeroth-order optimization problem driven by a bounded scalar loss defined directly on the string output via sequence similarity, and estimate the gradient with a random-direction finite-difference scheme whose query cost is independent of the image dimension. An Adam update with ell_infinity projection yields imperceptible perturbations for both untargeted and targeted objectives. Pilot experiments on Deep-OCR validate the string-only attack and evaluation pipeline and expose severe qualitative decoder failures, including repetition, truncation, and prompt leakage. They also show that controlled targeted rewriting remains substantially harder than untargeted degradation; we avoid claiming targeted success until the pre-registered evaluation is complete. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV) Cite as: arXiv:2608.07636 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.07636v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.07636 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Wenbo Sun [view email] [v1] Fri, 7 Aug 2026 15:05:12 UTC (3,322 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.CV References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 11, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 11, 2026
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