SoK: Cryptographic Key Recovery for Cryptoasset Custody and Financial Technologies
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 10, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.07104v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Cryptoasset systems often bind cryptographic key control to financial control: losing a wallet seed, custody share, hardware device, or smart-account credential can remove spend authority, while compromised recovery can enable theft. Existing work treats recovery through separate vocabularies--key backup, secret sharing, account recovery, credential re-issuance, social recovery, and asset migration--making mechanisms and tradeoffs difficult to comp
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 7 Aug 2026]
SoK: Cryptographic Key Recovery for Cryptoasset Custody and Financial Technologies
Francisco Javier Becerra Sanchez, Antonio Ken Iannillo, Radu State
Cryptoasset systems often bind cryptographic key control to financial control: losing a wallet seed, custody share, hardware device, or smart-account credential can remove spend authority, while compromised recovery can enable theft. Existing work treats recovery through separate vocabularies--key backup, secret sharing, account recovery, credential re-issuance, social recovery, and asset migration--making mechanisms and tradeoffs difficult to compare.
This paper presents a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on cryptographic key recovery for cryptoasset custody and financial technologies. Starting from a 118-paper systematic-review discovery corpus, we derive a 77-paper synthesis corpus and code each retained system in a master matrix covering recovered objects, recovery semantics, mechanisms, enrollment and storage, authorization, trust placement, failure events, post-recovery state, validation evidence, deployment status, privacy, usability, and limitations. The matrix supports an axis-first taxonomy that separates secret-restoring, hybrid, control-restoring, forensic/extractive, and framework-oriented recovery.
Our central observation is that recovery is not a single operation: systems may reconstruct an original secret, regenerate a seed, restore a share, reissue a credential, migrate signing authority, restore account control, move assets, or extract forensic artifacts. We derive a generalized construction model, check it against production-facing designs, and identify six findings: recovery semantics are heterogeneous; recovery shifts trust; liveness improvements create abuse paths; post-recovery lifecycle management is uneven; protocol evidence outpaces user evidence; and recovery metadata remains underprotected. These gaps motivate a research agenda for recovery-aware financial technologies.
Comments: 72 pages, 2 figures, 18 tables. Full version of the paper accepted at the International Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026). Includes the complete 77-system master matrix and seven-stage recovery walkthroughs. Reproducibility package: this https URL
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.07104 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.07104v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.07104
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Submission history
From: Francisco Javier Becerra Sanchez [view email]
[v1] Fri, 7 Aug 2026 11:00:33 UTC (276 KB)
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