When Context Bites: Detecting RAG Poisoning via Document-Level Attention Collapse
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 10, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.06947v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is indispensable for enhancing large language models. However, RAGs are increasingly susceptible to poisoning attacks, in which adversarial documents are injected to manipulate generator outputs. Previous methods rely on output-side signals such as perplexity and consistency checks to detect such attacks. Nevertheless, our analysis reveals that deliberate attacks often induce false confidence, where poisoned out
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 7 Aug 2026]
When Context Bites: Detecting RAG Poisoning via Document-Level Attention Collapse
Yingtao Ren, Ziyi Zhao, Yiwei Fu, Xiao Luo, Yu-Cheng Chang, Chin-Teng Lin
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is indispensable for enhancing large language models. However, RAGs are increasingly susceptible to poisoning attacks, in which adversarial documents are injected to manipulate generator outputs. Previous methods rely on output-side signals such as perplexity and consistency checks to detect such attacks. Nevertheless, our analysis reveals that deliberate attacks often induce false confidence, where poisoned outputs exhibit even lower perplexity than benign ones, rendering uncertainty-based detection ineffective. To address this challenge, we explore the internal dynamics of the generator and identify a distinctive signature termed \textit{Attention Collapse}. Unlike the dispersed attention in benign generations, attacked generations exhibit a decrease in entropy as attention concentrates on poisoned documents. Building on these findings, we propose \texttt{D-SCAN} (Document-level Signal Collapse Analysis), a lightweight detection framework that monitors attention dynamics to identify attacked generations. Extensive experiments on multiple attack benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. Moreover, D-SCAN can detect attacks even when they fail to alter the final answer. Code is available at this https URL.
Comments: Accepted by SIGIR2026
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.06947 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.06947v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.06947
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Related DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1145/3805712.3809904
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Submission history
From: Yingtao Ren [view email]
[v1] Fri, 7 Aug 2026 08:23:26 UTC (339 KB)
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