Policy-Masked Private Experts: Auditable and Reversible Capability Access Control in Sparse MoE Models
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 10, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.06690v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Most language-model access controls regulate behavior while leaving the same computation available to every request. We study a different systems question: can trusted authorization determine which newly trained parameters are reachable by the forward pass? Policy-Masked Private Experts freezes a pretrained sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model, trains a disjoint expert branch, and selects the public or private pool before top-k routing. The result
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 7 Aug 2026]
Policy-Masked Private Experts: Auditable and Reversible Capability Access Control in Sparse MoE Models
Zhuoheng Huang, Mukesh Singh
Most language-model access controls regulate behavior while leaving the same computation available to every request. We study a different systems question: can trusted authorization determine which newly trained parameters are reachable by the forward pass? Policy-Masked Private Experts freezes a pretrained sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model, trains a disjoint expert branch, and selects the public or private pool before top-k routing. The resulting claim is narrow but testable: under the declared trusted computing base (TCB), an unauthorized request executes no private expert. It does not imply that the public model lacks the same semantic capability.
We test this separation between execution control and task utility in Qwen3-30B-A3B and DeepSeek-V2-Lite. Three Qwen BF16 seeds update all 32 private experts while the public fingerprint remains unchanged. Across 64 adversarial scenarios and 96 deny/fail-closed events, unauthorized private execution is zero; independent hooks exactly match 11,616 routed private rows and allow-deny-allow recovery is exact. On two prospectively frozen Qwen benchmarks, the private branch improves exact tool use by 5.0 percentage points (pp) (five versus zero discordances; one-sided Holm p = 0.03125, corresponding two-sided exact p = 0.0625) and 21.3 pp (percentile-bootstrap 95% CI [13.3, 29.3], Holm p = 0.000031). Three arm-blinded model evaluators retain a positive external effect of 18.7 pp (95% CI [9.3, 28.0]). A parameter-matched Lora has similar external utility, but a post-hoc request gate leaves 1,225 adapter calls under deny; the disjoint expert branch leaves none. DeepSeek reproduces the route invariant and gains 27.0 pp. A valid sealed evaluation is near-neutral. These results support auditable, reversible control over a trained parameter path, while showing that useful transfer remains distribution dependent.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.06690 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.06690v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.06690
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From: Mukesh Singh [view email]
[v1] Fri, 7 Aug 2026 01:39:36 UTC (25 KB)
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