Model Confidence Under Answer-Preserving Attacks: An Informativeness-Manipulability Frontier
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 10, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.06571v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Deployed vision-language systems often gate their answers on confidence, making confidence robustness relevant to oversight. We study confidence readouts under white-box, image-only attacks constrained to preserve the generated answer byte-identically. Under a reachability assumption, an unmovable readout cannot outperform the answer-string accuracy prior, whose pooled value is 0.617. Independently of that assumption, a uniform amplitude certificat
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 6 Aug 2026]
Model Confidence Under Answer-Preserving Attacks: An Informativeness-Manipulability Frontier
Reza Khanmohammadi, Ivan Brugere, Simerjot Kaur, Charese H. Smiley, Kundan Thind, Mohammad M. Ghassemi
Deployed vision-language systems often gate their answers on confidence, making confidence robustness relevant to oversight. We study confidence readouts under white-box, image-only attacks constrained to preserve the generated answer byte-identically. Under a reachability assumption, an unmovable readout cannot outperform the answer-string accuracy prior, whose pooled value is 0.617. Independently of that assumption, a uniform amplitude certificate below a measurable threshold guarantees adversarial discrimination above the same floor. Across four vision-language models, three visual question answering benchmarks, five deployed confidence channels and two defense estimators, direct or surrogate-aimed attacks produce itemwise feasible perturbations that refute this uniform certificate in all 84 estimator-by-cell combinations. Coordinated correctness-label-aware attacks drive adversarial discrimination to or below the answer-string floor in all sixty deployed-channel cells, including all fifty-nine that begin above it. Hidden-state interventions and an open-ended text-model activation-space replication show that comparable confidence movement can be induced at the representation level rather than only through adversarial images. None of four tested defense families establishes a robust alternative under the specific evaluation applied to it. In a confidence-gated simulation, a coordinated token-probability attack transferred to a hidden-state gate causes up to 84.8% of previously rejected wrong answers to become accepted. After reweighting to each benchmark's natural correctness prevalence, accepted accuracy falls below the no-gate baseline in eight of twelve cells under transfer and all twelve under a direct gate-aimed attack. Under the studied threat model and budget, confidence is therefore an integrity-sensitive rather than intrinsically robust oversight signal.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.06571 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.06571v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.06571
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From: Reza Khanmohammadi [view email]
[v1] Thu, 6 Aug 2026 20:27:52 UTC (101 KB)
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