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StepJack: Benchmarking Computer-Use Agent Safety Against Multi-Step Indirect Prompt Injection

arXiv Security Archived Aug 10, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.06477v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Computer-use agents (CUAs) face a growing threat from indirect prompt injection, where adversarial instructions are planted in the environment such as web pages. In this paper, we introduce multi-step indirect prompt injection, a new attack class against CUAs in which the adversarial goal is decomposed into multiple innocuous-looking sub-steps and distributed across a chain of pages referenced along the agent's navigation path. We develop a pipelin

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 6 Aug 2026] StepJack: Benchmarking Computer-Use Agent Safety Against Multi-Step Indirect Prompt Injection Zhuoxin Zhan, Akbar Rafiey, Avery Ma, Leila Pishdad, Layla El Asri Computer-use agents (CUAs) face a growing threat from indirect prompt injection, where adversarial instructions are planted in the environment such as web pages. In this paper, we introduce multi-step indirect prompt injection, a new attack class against CUAs in which the adversarial goal is decomposed into multiple innocuous-looking sub-steps and distributed across a chain of pages referenced along the agent's navigation path. We develop a pipeline to automatically decompose an adversarial goal under the constraint that the execution of the decomposed sub-steps must achieve the original goal while optimizing the innocuousness of each decomposed sub-step. With this pipeline, we build StepJack, a CUA safety benchmark with 480 test examples. On this benchmark, we evaluate six state-of-the-art CUAs and find that at a fixed decomposition depth, multi-step attacks raise attack success rate (ASR) on three of six CUAs, by up to 31.2 points (e.g., GPT-5.4-mini: 41.7% at single-step to 72.9% at three-step); averaged over the five CUAs that can reliably follow the reference chain (all but EvoCUA-32B), ASR rises from 31.3% at single-step to 36.9% at three-step. Dataset and code are available at this https URL. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL) Cite as: arXiv:2608.06477 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.06477v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.06477 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Zhuoxin Zhan [view email] [v1] Thu, 6 Aug 2026 18:14:30 UTC (2,443 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.CL References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 10, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 10, 2026
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