CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning Mar 20, 2026

Cross-Ecosystem Vulnerability Analysis for Python Applications

arXiv Security Archived Mar 20, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.18693v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Python applications depend on native libraries that may be vendored within package distributions or installed on the host system. When vulnerabilities are discovered in these libraries, determining which Python packages are affected requires cross-ecosystem analysis spanning Python dependency graphs and OS package versions. Current vulnerability scanners produce false negatives by missing vendored vulnerabilities and false positives by ignoring sec

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 19 Mar 2026] Cross-Ecosystem Vulnerability Analysis for Python Applications Georgios Alexopoulos, Nikolaos Alexopoulos, Thodoris Sotiropoulos, Charalambos Mitropoulos, Zhendong Su, Dimitris Mitropoulos Python applications depend on native libraries that may be vendored within package distributions or installed on the host system. When vulnerabilities are discovered in these libraries, determining which Python packages are affected requires cross-ecosystem analysis spanning Python dependency graphs and OS package versions. Current vulnerability scanners produce false negatives by missing vendored vulnerabilities and false positives by ignoring security patches backported by OS distributions. We present a provenance-aware vulnerability analysis approach that resolves vendored libraries to specific OS package versions or upstream releases. Our approach queries vendored libraries against a database of historical OS package artifacts using content-based hashing, and applies library-specific dynamic analyses to extract version information from binaries built from upstream source. We then construct cross-ecosystem call graphs by stitching together Python and binary call graphs across dependency boundaries, enabling reachability analysis of vulnerable functions. Evaluating on 100,000 Python packages and 10 known CVEs associated with third-party native dependencies, we identify 39 directly vulnerable packages (47M+ monthly downloads) and 312 indirectly vulnerable client packages affected through dependency chains. Our analysis achieves up to 97% false positive reduction compared to upstream version matching. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Software Engineering (cs.SE) Cite as: arXiv:2603.18693 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.18693v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.18693 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Georgios Alexopoulos [view email] [v1] Thu, 19 Mar 2026 09:52:29 UTC (591 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.SE References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 20, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 20, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗