Secure Wi-Fi Ranging Today: Security and Adoption of IEEE 802.11az/bk
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 20, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.18687v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Ranging and localisation have become critical for many applications and services. The Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) standard is a natural candidate for providing these functions across diverse environments, given its widespread deployment. The IEEE 802.11az amendment, finalised in 2023, introduces "Next Generation Positioning" mechanisms to secure and harden the existing insecure Wi-Fi Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) ranging solution. Moreover, the recent IEEE
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 19 Mar 2026]
Secure Wi-Fi Ranging Today: Security and Adoption of IEEE 802.11az/bk
Nikola Antonijević, Bernhard Etzlinger, Dave Singelée, Bart Preneel
Ranging and localisation have become critical for many applications and services. The Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) standard is a natural candidate for providing these functions across diverse environments, given its widespread deployment. The IEEE 802.11az amendment, finalised in 2023, introduces "Next Generation Positioning" mechanisms to secure and harden the existing insecure Wi-Fi Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) ranging solution. Moreover, the recent IEEE 802.11bk amendment increases the available bandwidth with the goal of approaching the centimetre-level ranging accuracy of ultra-wideband (UWB) systems. This paper examines to what extent these promises hold from a security and deployability perspective. We analyse the core mechanisms of secure Wi-Fi ranging as defined in IEEE 802.11az and IEEE 802.11bk at both the logical and physical layers, combining standards analysis with simulations and measurements on commercial and development hardware. At the logical layer, we show how common deployment choices can result in unauthenticated ranging, downgrade attacks, and simple denial-of-service attacks, making it difficult to securely realise many high-stakes use cases. At the physical layer, we study the predictability of secure ranging waveforms, the security impact of symbol repetition, and how waveform design choices affect compliance with spectral masks under realistic RF behaviour. Our results show that secure Wi-Fi ranging is highly sensitive to configuration choices and is non-trivial to implement on existing hardware. This is also evidenced by the currently limited support for secure Wi-Fi ranging in commodity devices. This paper provides practical guidelines for using secure FTM safely and recommendations to vendors and standardisation bodies to improve its robustness and deployability.
Comments: Submitted
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.18687 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.18687v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.18687
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From: Nikola Antonijević [view email]
[v1] Thu, 19 Mar 2026 09:46:43 UTC (471 KB)
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