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Beyond TVLA: Anderson-Darling Leakage Assessment for Neural Network Side-Channel Leakage Detection

arXiv Security Archived Mar 20, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.18647v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) based on Welch's $t$-test has become a standard tool for detecting side-channel leakage. However, its mean-based nature can limit sensitivity when leakage manifests primarily through higher-order distributional differences. As our experiments show, this property becomes especially crucial when it comes to evaluating neural network implementations. In this work, we propose Anderson--Darling Leakage Assessment (A

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 19 Mar 2026] Beyond TVLA: Anderson-Darling Leakage Assessment for Neural Network Side-Channel Leakage Detection Ján Mikulec, Jakub Breier, Xiaolu Hou Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) based on Welch's t-test has become a standard tool for detecting side-channel leakage. However, its mean-based nature can limit sensitivity when leakage manifests primarily through higher-order distributional differences. As our experiments show, this property becomes especially crucial when it comes to evaluating neural network implementations. In this work, we propose Anderson--Darling Leakage Assessment (ADLA), a leakage detection framework that applies the two-sample Anderson--Darling test for leakage detection. Unlike TVLA, ADLA tests equality of the full cumulative distribution functions and does not rely on a purely mean-shift model. We evaluate ADLA on a multilayer perceptron (MLP) trained on MNIST and implemented on a ChipWhisperer-Husky evaluation platform. We consider protected implementations employing shuffling and random jitter countermeasures. Our results show that ADLA can provide improved leakage-detection sensitivity in protected implementations for a low number of traces compared to TVLA. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2603.18647 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.18647v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.18647 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Jakub Breier [view email] [v1] Thu, 19 Mar 2026 09:12:04 UTC (2,107 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 20, 2026
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    Mar 20, 2026
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