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Prompt Control-Flow Integrity: A Priority-Aware Runtime Defense Against Prompt Injection in LLM Systems

arXiv Security Archived Mar 20, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.18433v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) deployed behind APIs and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) stacks are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that may override system policies, subvert intended behavior, and induce unsafe outputs. Existing defenses often treat prompts as flat strings and rely on ad hoc filtering or static jailbreak detection. This paper proposes Prompt Control-Flow Integrity (PCFI), a priority-aware runtime defense that models each

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 19 Mar 2026] Prompt Control-Flow Integrity: A Priority-Aware Runtime Defense Against Prompt Injection in LLM Systems Md Takrim Ul Alam, Akif Islam, Mohd Ruhul Ameen, Abu Saleh Musa Miah, Jungpil Shin Large language models (LLMs) deployed behind APIs and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) stacks are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that may override system policies, subvert intended behavior, and induce unsafe outputs. Existing defenses often treat prompts as flat strings and rely on ad hoc filtering or static jailbreak detection. This paper proposes Prompt Control-Flow Integrity (PCFI), a priority-aware runtime defense that models each request as a structured composition of system, developer, user, and retrieved-document segments. PCFI applies a three-stage middleware pipeline, lexical heuristics, role-switch detection, and hierarchical policy enforcement, before forwarding requests to the backend LLM. We implement PCFI as a FastAPI-based gateway for deployed LLM APIs and evaluate it on a custom benchmark of synthetic and semi-realistic prompt-injection workloads. On the evaluated benchmark suite, PCFI intercepts all attack-labeled requests, maintains a 0% False Positive Rate, and introduces a median processing overhead of only 0.04 ms. These results suggest that provenance- and priority-aware prompt enforcement is a practical and lightweight defense for deployed LLM systems. Comments: 4 Figures, 3 Tables, Submitted to the International Conference on Power, Electronics, Communications, Computing, and Intelligent Infrastructure 2026 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2603.18433 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.18433v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.18433 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Akif Islam [view email] [v1] Thu, 19 Mar 2026 02:50:15 UTC (9,416 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 20, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 20, 2026
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