CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning Mar 20, 2026

MAED: Mathematical Activation Error Detection for Mitigating Physical Fault Attacks in DNN Inference

arXiv Security Archived Mar 20, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.18120v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The inference phase of deep neural networks (DNNs) in embedded systems is increasingly vulnerable to fault attacks and failures, which can result in incorrect predictions. These vulnerabilities can potentially lead to catastrophic consequences, making the development of effective mitigation techniques essential. In this paper, we introduce MAED (Mathematical Activation Error Detection), an algorithm-level error detection framework that exploits mat

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 18 Mar 2026] MAED: Mathematical Activation Error Detection for Mitigating Physical Fault Attacks in DNN Inference Kasra Ahmadi, Saeed Aghapour, Mehran Mozaffari Kermani, Reza Azarderakhsh The inference phase of deep neural networks (DNNs) in embedded systems is increasingly vulnerable to fault attacks and failures, which can result in incorrect predictions. These vulnerabilities can potentially lead to catastrophic consequences, making the development of effective mitigation techniques essential. In this paper, we introduce MAED (Mathematical Activation Error Detection), an algorithm-level error detection framework that exploits mathematical identities to continuously validate the correctness of non-linear activation function computations at runtime. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to integrate algorithm-level error detection techniques to defend against both malicious fault injection attacks and naturally occurring faults in critical DNN components in embedded systems. The evaluation is conducted on three widely adopted activation functions, namely ReLu, sigmoid, and tanh which serve as fundamental building blocks for introducing non-linearity in DNNs and can lead to mispredictions when subjected to natural faults or fault attacks. We assessed the proposed error detection scheme via fault model simulation, achieving close to 100% error detection while mitigating existing fault attacks on DNN inference. Additionally, the overhead introduced by integrating the proposed scheme with the baseline implementation (i.e., without error detection) is validated through implementations on an AMD/Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA and an ATmega328P microcontroller, as well as through integration with TensorFlow. On the microcontroller, the proposed error detection incurs less than 1% clock cycle overhead, while on the FPGA it requires nearly zero additional area, at the cost of approximately a 20% increase in latency for sigmoid and tanh. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2603.18120 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.18120v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.18120 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Kasra Ahmadi [view email] [v1] Wed, 18 Mar 2026 16:13:48 UTC (974 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 20, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 20, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗