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The Vulnerability With No CVE: Managing Persistent Gaps Between Mandate and Authority in AI Coding Agents

arXiv Security Archived Aug 08, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.05884v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing guidance identifies excessive agency, excessive permission, weak task-bound authorization, and inadequate agent controls as important risks. Control frameworks also describe capabilities for constraining, authorizing, observing, validating, and responding to agent activity. Yet security programs still need a way to manage persistent deployed instances that span components and outlive any one event. We propose the agentic posture vulnerabil

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 6 Aug 2026] The Vulnerability With No CVE: Managing Persistent Gaps Between Mandate and Authority in AI Coding Agents Shayell Aharon Salomon Amir Shaked Matan Noga Existing guidance identifies excessive agency, excessive permission, weak task-bound authorization, and inadequate agent controls as important risks. Control frameworks also describe capabilities for constraining, authorizing, observing, validating, and responding to agent activity. Yet security programs still need a way to manage persistent deployed instances that span components and outlive any one event. We propose the agentic posture vulnerability (APV) as a task-conditioned vulnerability-management abstraction: a durable record for a composed agent-control exposure. One posture may produce different runtime manifestations across tasks; APV links those manifestations to the invariant posture and remains open until authority is narrowed, a missing control is added, risk is accepted, or closure is verified. APV is not proposed as a new root-cause class of risk; it operationalizes existing excessive-agency, authorization, and control-composition weaknesses. We distinguish APVs from CVE-addressable product defects, OWASP Excessive Agency, Agent Baseline control outcomes, and the runtime authorization-execution gap. We then provide a field vignette, a thresholded definition, six recurring APV patterns, a vulnerability lifecycle, a minimum record, a control-and-closure matrix, tooling implications, and a testable research agenda. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL) Cite as: arXiv:2608.05884 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.05884v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.05884 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Shayell Aharon [view email] [v1] Thu, 6 Aug 2026 11:06:06 UTC (17 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.CL References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 08, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 08, 2026
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