The Vulnerability With No CVE: Managing Persistent Gaps Between Mandate and Authority in AI Coding Agents
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 08, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.05884v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing guidance identifies excessive agency, excessive permission, weak task-bound authorization, and inadequate agent controls as important risks. Control frameworks also describe capabilities for constraining, authorizing, observing, validating, and responding to agent activity. Yet security programs still need a way to manage persistent deployed instances that span components and outlive any one event. We propose the agentic posture vulnerabil
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 6 Aug 2026]
The Vulnerability With No CVE: Managing Persistent Gaps Between Mandate and Authority in AI Coding Agents
Shayell Aharon Salomon Amir Shaked Matan Noga
Existing guidance identifies excessive agency, excessive permission, weak task-bound authorization, and inadequate agent controls as important risks. Control frameworks also describe capabilities for constraining, authorizing, observing, validating, and responding to agent activity. Yet security programs still need a way to manage persistent deployed instances that span components and outlive any one event.
We propose the agentic posture vulnerability (APV) as a task-conditioned vulnerability-management abstraction: a durable record for a composed agent-control exposure. One posture may produce different runtime manifestations across tasks; APV links those manifestations to the invariant posture and remains open until authority is narrowed, a missing control is added, risk is accepted, or closure is verified. APV is not proposed as a new root-cause class of risk; it operationalizes existing excessive-agency, authorization, and control-composition weaknesses.
We distinguish APVs from CVE-addressable product defects, OWASP Excessive Agency, Agent Baseline control outcomes, and the runtime authorization-execution gap. We then provide a field vignette, a thresholded definition, six recurring APV patterns, a vulnerability lifecycle, a minimum record, a control-and-closure matrix, tooling implications, and a testable research agenda.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.05884 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.05884v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.05884
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Shayell Aharon [view email]
[v1] Thu, 6 Aug 2026 11:06:06 UTC (17 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-08
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.CL
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)