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Detecting Safety Training Modification in Language Models via Activation Analysis

arXiv Security Archived Aug 07, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.05578v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce AMS (Activation-based Model Scanner), a tool that detects modifications to safety training in language models by measuring the geometric structure of safety-relevant concepts in activation space. Safety training creates measurable separation between harmful and benign content classes; certain safety modifications collapse or rotate this structure, while others leave it intact. We validate AMS across 14 model configurations spanning 4 a

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 6 Aug 2026] Detecting Safety Training Modification in Language Models via Activation Analysis Glen Messenger We introduce AMS (Activation-based Model Scanner), a tool that detects modifications to safety training in language models by measuring the geometric structure of safety-relevant concepts in activation space. Safety training creates measurable separation between harmful and benign content classes; certain safety modifications collapse or rotate this structure, while others leave it intact. We validate AMS across 14 model configurations spanning 4 architecture families (Llama, Gemma, Qwen, Mistral) and four safety-modification categories (instruction-tuned, base, abliterated, uncensored fine-tunes). Leave-one-out cross-validation of thresholds achieves 71% accuracy (10/14); bootstrap 95% confidence intervals on sigma point estimates have median width 3.4 sigma. We measure behavioral compliance on 20 stratified JailbreakBench prompts per model and find that sigma on the harmful-content concept predicts compliance with Pearson r = -0.546 (p = 0.043), directionally but with meaningful noise. Mechanistic analysis identifies a four-class taxonomy of safety-training modifications distinguished by activation-space signature: training removal collapses cluster separation; weight-orthogonalization abliteration both collapses separation and rotates the refusal direction; rotation-without-collapse abliteration preserves separation while rotating direction; and behavioral fine-tuning preserves both magnitude and direction. AMS's Tier 1 sigma-threshold detects the first two classes; Tier 2 direction-similarity verification detects the third. The fourth is undetectable by activation-only probing and represents a documented failure mode. We discuss threshold calibration, limitations of single-run measurement, and the open problem of detecting behavioral-only safety modifications. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2608.05578 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.05578v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.05578 Focus to learn more Journal reference: IEEE Access, vol. 14, pp. 91723-91737, 2026 Related DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2026.3704057 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Glen Messenger [view email] [v1] Thu, 6 Aug 2026 03:57:38 UTC (196 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 07, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 07, 2026
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