Detecting Safety Training Modification in Language Models via Activation Analysis
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 07, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.05578v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce AMS (Activation-based Model Scanner), a tool that detects modifications to safety training in language models by measuring the geometric structure of safety-relevant concepts in activation space. Safety training creates measurable separation between harmful and benign content classes; certain safety modifications collapse or rotate this structure, while others leave it intact. We validate AMS across 14 model configurations spanning 4 a
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 6 Aug 2026]
Detecting Safety Training Modification in Language Models via Activation Analysis
Glen Messenger
We introduce AMS (Activation-based Model Scanner), a tool that detects modifications to safety training in language models by measuring the geometric structure of safety-relevant concepts in activation space. Safety training creates measurable separation between harmful and benign content classes; certain safety modifications collapse or rotate this structure, while others leave it intact. We validate AMS across 14 model configurations spanning 4 architecture families (Llama, Gemma, Qwen, Mistral) and four safety-modification categories (instruction-tuned, base, abliterated, uncensored fine-tunes). Leave-one-out cross-validation of thresholds achieves 71% accuracy (10/14); bootstrap 95% confidence intervals on sigma point estimates have median width 3.4 sigma. We measure behavioral compliance on 20 stratified JailbreakBench prompts per model and find that sigma on the harmful-content concept predicts compliance with Pearson r = -0.546 (p = 0.043), directionally but with meaningful noise. Mechanistic analysis identifies a four-class taxonomy of safety-training modifications distinguished by activation-space signature: training removal collapses cluster separation; weight-orthogonalization abliteration both collapses separation and rotates the refusal direction; rotation-without-collapse abliteration preserves separation while rotating direction; and behavioral fine-tuning preserves both magnitude and direction. AMS's Tier 1 sigma-threshold detects the first two classes; Tier 2 direction-similarity verification detects the third. The fourth is undetectable by activation-only probing and represents a documented failure mode. We discuss threshold calibration, limitations of single-run measurement, and the open problem of detecting behavioral-only safety modifications.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.05578 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.05578v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.05578
Focus to learn more
Journal reference: IEEE Access, vol. 14, pp. 91723-91737, 2026
Related DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2026.3704057
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Glen Messenger [view email]
[v1] Thu, 6 Aug 2026 03:57:38 UTC (196 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-08
Change to browse by:
cs
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)