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Behavioral Residualization for Unsupervised Intrusion Detection in Automotive CAN Networks

arXiv Security Archived Aug 07, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.05548v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern vehicles rely on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, whose design prioritizes low cost and real-time performance but provides no message authentication or encryption. An attacker with physical or remote access can therefore inject arbitrary frames, making intrusion detection an important defense-in-depth mechanism. Most published CAN intrusion detection systems rely on presence-based features, such as novel arbitration IDs, frozen payload

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 6 Aug 2026] Behavioral Residualization for Unsupervised Intrusion Detection in Automotive CAN Networks Chandan Hegde, Mukundh R Reddy Modern vehicles rely on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, whose design prioritizes low cost and real-time performance but provides no message authentication or encryption. An attacker with physical or remote access can therefore inject arbitrary frames, making intrusion detection an important defense-in-depth mechanism. Most published CAN intrusion detection systems rely on presence-based features, such as novel arbitration IDs, frozen payload bytes, or anomalous DLC values. These features perform well on public datasets containing easily separable attacks but fail when attackers reuse legitimate arbitration IDs. We present per-ID behavioral residualization, a CAN-specific representation that extracts fourteen temporal, protocol, and payload features from sliding windows and residualizes them against each arbitration ID's normal baseline. Our central claim is that this representation, rather than any individual detector, drives the performance gains. Across six unsupervised detectors and two datasets, residualization improves mean F1 in the majority of evaluations (21/24 on HCRL and 30/36 on ROAD across five seeds). On the more realistic ROAD dataset, where attacks reuse legitimate IDs, the representation achieves recall >= 0.99 with high ROC-AUC on targeted signal-manipulation attacks. Two limitations are explicitly quantified: novel-ID flooding (HCRL DoS, F1 = 0.02) and cross-ID fuzzing (ROAD, F1 = 0.27), defining the measured coverage boundary of the proposed representation. Comments: 9 pages, 5 figures, 8 tables Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2608.05548 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.05548v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.05548 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Chandan Hegde [view email] [v1] Thu, 6 Aug 2026 03:03:28 UTC (339 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 07, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 07, 2026
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