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PromptShield Home: Ambient Multimodal Prompt Injection Defense for Smart-Home Agents

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arXiv:2608.05495v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Smart-home assistants increasingly use multimodal large language models (MLLMs) that perceive video and audio directly. This raises a safety question specific to the home: can the agent tell a genuine user command from ambient or externally-sourced content, television speech, on-screen text, or an overheard conversation, that merely looks like a command? We introduce PromptShield-Home, a pilot benchmark of realistic smart-home scenarios spanning ad

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 6 Aug 2026] PromptShield Home: Ambient Multimodal Prompt Injection Defense for Smart-Home Agents He Zhang, Feilong Li, Dingning Long, Yilin Cui, Peijun Zhang, Yuewen Zhang, Qianyao Xu, Xinyi Fu Smart-home assistants increasingly use multimodal large language models (MLLMs) that perceive video and audio directly. This raises a safety question specific to the home: can the agent tell a genuine user command from ambient or externally-sourced content, television speech, on-screen text, or an overheard conversation, that merely looks like a command? We introduce PromptShield-Home, a pilot benchmark of realistic smart-home scenarios spanning addressee ambiguity, screen/audio injection, health-monitor false triggers, mixed occupancy, and a legitimate-command floor, and use it to compare three abstraction layers: traditional detectors (L0), a single MLLM agent (L1; vision, vision+ASR, and audio-visual), and multi-agent mediation (L2; voting, role specialists, cross-model arbitration). Because the label distribution is skewed toward inaction, aggregate accuracy is misleading, a constant always-block predictor scores 82%, so we report unsafe-execution and safe-completion rates separately. The two paradigms fail in opposite ways: detectors act on everything, while every MLLM configuration over-refuses, completing almost no genuine command and missing a true fall in every case. Crucially, their correct sets are disjoint: an oracle that always picks the right layer reaches 94.1%, against 76.5% for the best single layer. We report this as an upper bound, not a system - no router is implemented - and argue that home-agent safety is best served by learned routing and sensor fusion, not by replacing detectors with an MLLM. Comments: This work has been accepted as a poster to UbiComp 2026 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC) Cite as: arXiv:2608.05495 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.05495v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.05495 Focus to learn more Related DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3798063.3837198 Focus to learn more Submission history From: He Zhang [view email] [v1] Thu, 6 Aug 2026 00:51:46 UTC (346 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.HC References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
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    Aug 07, 2026
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    Aug 07, 2026
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