PromptShield Home: Ambient Multimodal Prompt Injection Defense for Smart-Home Agents
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 07, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.05495v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Smart-home assistants increasingly use multimodal large language models (MLLMs) that perceive video and audio directly. This raises a safety question specific to the home: can the agent tell a genuine user command from ambient or externally-sourced content, television speech, on-screen text, or an overheard conversation, that merely looks like a command? We introduce PromptShield-Home, a pilot benchmark of realistic smart-home scenarios spanning ad
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 6 Aug 2026]
PromptShield Home: Ambient Multimodal Prompt Injection Defense for Smart-Home Agents
He Zhang, Feilong Li, Dingning Long, Yilin Cui, Peijun Zhang, Yuewen Zhang, Qianyao Xu, Xinyi Fu
Smart-home assistants increasingly use multimodal large language models (MLLMs) that perceive video and audio directly. This raises a safety question specific to the home: can the agent tell a genuine user command from ambient or externally-sourced content, television speech, on-screen text, or an overheard conversation, that merely looks like a command? We introduce PromptShield-Home, a pilot benchmark of realistic smart-home scenarios spanning addressee ambiguity, screen/audio injection, health-monitor false triggers, mixed occupancy, and a legitimate-command floor, and use it to compare three abstraction layers: traditional detectors (L0), a single MLLM agent (L1; vision, vision+ASR, and audio-visual), and multi-agent mediation (L2; voting, role specialists, cross-model arbitration). Because the label distribution is skewed toward inaction, aggregate accuracy is misleading, a constant always-block predictor scores 82%, so we report unsafe-execution and safe-completion rates separately. The two paradigms fail in opposite ways: detectors act on everything, while every MLLM configuration over-refuses, completing almost no genuine command and missing a true fall in every case. Crucially, their correct sets are disjoint: an oracle that always picks the right layer reaches 94.1%, against 76.5% for the best single layer. We report this as an upper bound, not a system - no router is implemented - and argue that home-agent safety is best served by learned routing and sensor fusion, not by replacing detectors with an MLLM.
Comments: This work has been accepted as a poster to UbiComp 2026
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.05495 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.05495v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.05495
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Related DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1145/3798063.3837198
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Submission history
From: He Zhang [view email]
[v1] Thu, 6 Aug 2026 00:51:46 UTC (346 KB)
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