SafeCommit: Certifying When Memory-Grounded Agents May Safely Act
arXiv AIArchived Aug 06, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.04289v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Long-horizon agents increasingly use persistent memory and tools to take actions with external side effects. A central failure mode is premature commitment: an agent acts before resolving whether its memory grounding is stale, conflicting, incomplete, or corrupted. We formalize this problem as safe commitment under memory uncertainty and introduce SafeCommit, a risk controlled layer between agent reasoning and external execution. The layer construc
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
[Submitted on 4 Aug 2026]
SafeCommit: Certifying When Memory-Grounded Agents May Safely Act
Mayur Akewar, Ravi Ranjan
Long-horizon agents increasingly use persistent memory and tools to take actions with external side effects. A central failure mode is premature commitment: an agent acts before resolving whether its memory grounding is stale, conflicting, incomplete, or corrupted. We formalize this problem as safe commitment under memory uncertainty and introduce SafeCommit, a risk controlled layer between agent reasoning and external execution. The layer constructs a calibrated set of plausible latent worlds from memory, observations, tool outputs, provenance, and policy constraints. It permits a side effectful action only when a conformal action certificate shows that the action is safe in every retained world. Otherwise, it selects a low-side-effect probe that targets the worlds blocking certification, or returns a conservative fallback. Under calibrated world coverage, the probability of an unsafe certified commit is at most the target level {\alpha}; with imperfect world proposal, the bound separates calibration and representation error. A dependency-free controlled simulator illustrates the safety-utility tradeoff and reproduces all reported results with one command. The goal is to offer a concrete approach for deciding not only what an agent should do, but when the available evidence is sufficient to safely do it.
Comments: 14 pages, 6 tables, and 1 figure, target NeurIPS
Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.04289 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2608.04289v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.04289
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Submission history
From: Ravi Ranjan Kumar [view email]
[v1] Tue, 4 Aug 2026 23:44:35 UTC (25 KB)
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