LoginTrap: Uncovering Task-Agnostic Phishing-Style Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks against LLM-based Web Agents
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 06, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.04741v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-based web agents automate user tasks by observing webpages and executing browser actions on behalf of users. As these agents operate on real web services, login becomes a sensitive authentication boundary because it involves credentials and sensitive information. Existing work shows that malicious webpage content can manipulate web agent actions, but it has not fully examined whether such content can induce login and cause end-to-end private da
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 5 Aug 2026]
LoginTrap: Uncovering Task-Agnostic Phishing-Style Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks against LLM-based Web Agents
Longtao Guo, Zelin Zhang, Kaifeng Huang, Yang Shi
LLM-based web agents automate user tasks by observing webpages and executing browser actions on behalf of users. As these agents operate on real web services, login becomes a sensitive authentication boundary because it involves credentials and sensitive information. Existing work shows that malicious webpage content can manipulate web agent actions, but it has not fully examined whether such content can induce login and cause end-to-end private data leakage. We study this attack surface and present LoginTrap, a task-agnostic login-inducing attack against LLM-based web agents. LoginTrap assumes a black box attacker that controls the webpage context and the induced login flow without knowing the user task or web agent internals. Under this threat model, LoginTrap uses webpage context to generate page-specific indirect injections through a fuzzing-inspired process, making login appear as a plausible prerequisite for continuing the task and guiding the agent to a controlled login page. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of LoginTrap across realistic web agent executions. The results show that LoginTrap reaches 86\% average end-to-end attack success across LLM backbones and remains effective across agent architectures and defenses. These findings identify login inducement as a systematic authentication boundary risk and motivate further research on authentication-aware defenses for web agents.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.04741 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.04741v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.04741
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From: Longtao Guo [view email]
[v1] Wed, 5 Aug 2026 12:08:16 UTC (423 KB)
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