Adversarial Attacks for Good: A Survey of Proactive Protection across the Visual Content Lifecycle

Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 5 Aug 2026] Adversarial Attacks for Good: A Survey of Proactive Protection across the Visual Content Lifecycle Jiaming Zhang, Boyang Chen, Zherui Li, Fuyao Zhang, Xinyu Yan, Hong Xi Tae, Wenwen He, Xuan Wang, Siqi Guo, Junhao Dong, Kun Wang, Hanxun Huang, Yige Li, Xingjun Ma, Yang Cao, Lingjuan Lyu, Wei Yang Bryan Lim Once visual content enters an AI pipeline, its owner often retains little technical control over how it is used. Legal and regulatory remedies can address misuse, but many technical interventions must be applied earlier, when content is released or accessed. This survey examines the protective paradigm that has grown around this intervention point, which we call \emph{adversarial attacks for good}. Perturbations and structured signals long studied as attacks on learned models are instead applied by data owners, creators, platforms, or auditors to disrupt unauthorized automation or support later accountability. Five research communities have arrived at this inversion largely independently, each addressing a different stage of a visual asset's lifecycle: privacy filters against unwanted recognition at sharing time, unlearnable examples against unauthorized training, generative safeguards against malicious editing or imitation, adversarial CAPTCHAs for access control against automated agents, and provenance mechanisms for post-circulation attribution. Although developed in separate venues with incompatible success criteria, many of these methods exploit persistent gaps between human perception, semantic interpretation, and machine inference, suggesting that the paradigm remains relevant as visual pipelines evolve toward multimodal models and autonomous agents. To make their claims comparable, we evaluate all five families along shared axes of transferability, adaptability, and deployment readiness. Across the lifecycle, we find that most protections are still validated mainly against static or weakly adaptive adversaries, while evidence beyond controlled benchmarks remains scarce. We close by consolidating cross-stage countermeasures and open problems for robust, composable, and deployable owner-side protection. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV) Cite as: arXiv:2608.04314 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.04314v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.04314 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Jiaming Zhang [view email] [v1] Wed, 5 Aug 2026 00:46:50 UTC (1,435 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.CV References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)