CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning Aug 05, 2026

DP-MemView: A Memory Interface for Attribute-Level Transcript Privacy in Long-Term LLM Agents

arXiv Security Archived Aug 05, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.03130v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Long-term memory enables persistent personalization in LLM agents, but repeated memory-conditioned responses can cumulatively reveal protected attributes even when they are never stated explicitly. We formalize this threat as adaptive transcript privacy and introduce DP-MemView, a differentially private interface that privately selects public response-conditioning views and exposes those views---rather than raw memory---to the response LLM. Each pr

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 4 Aug 2026] DP-MemView: A Memory Interface for Attribute-Level Transcript Privacy in Long-Term LLM Agents Jong Wook Kim, Byoungjae Min, Kennedy Edemacu, Yoonhyuk Choi, Sae-Hong Cho, Beakcheol Jang Long-term memory enables persistent personalization in LLM agents, but repeated memory-conditioned responses can cumulatively reveal protected attributes even when they are never stated explicitly. We formalize this threat as adaptive transcript privacy and introduce DP-MemView, a differentially private interface that privately selects public response-conditioning views and exposes those views---rather than raw memory---to the response LLM. Each private selection is charged to every protected attribute whose memory group intersects the read set. Per-attribute ledgers block any selection that would exceed its cap and return a fixed generic view instead. Under an explicit interface contract, we prove pure B_a-DP for the entire adaptive transcript. We also extend the result to stores that differ across multiple protected groups and bound how much observing the transcript can change an adversary's prior odds. We evaluate the online and preallocated modes with three response LLMs on a controlled adjacent-store benchmark and a public-corpus transfer track. Both modes keep transcript distinguishability near chance while preserving target-required personalization and overall response quality. Further diagnostics show that removing key safeguards causes mismatched output support, missing ledger charges, revealing side channels, or growing long-horizon leakage. Comments: 18 pages, 2 figures, 9 tables Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2608.03130 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.03130v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.03130 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Jong Wook Kim [view email] [v1] Tue, 4 Aug 2026 05:00:10 UTC (327 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.CL cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 05, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 05, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗