Evading Chain-of-Thought Monitoring Through Model Poisoning
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 05, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.02820v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is an increasingly important component of AI safety stacks but relies on the assumption that a model's reasoning trace is informative about its actions. This work studies the limits of CoT monitoring through the lens of model poisoning. We demonstrate that backdoors can be implanted into reasoning models to elicit an attacker-chosen behavior while their CoT traces appear entirely benign. We find that these CoT-Hidd
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 3 Aug 2026]
Evading Chain-of-Thought Monitoring Through Model Poisoning
Giorgio Severi, Shujaat Mirza, Blake Bullwinkel, Amanda Minnich
Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is an increasingly important component of AI safety stacks but relies on the assumption that a model's reasoning trace is informative about its actions. This work studies the limits of CoT monitoring through the lens of model poisoning. We demonstrate that backdoors can be implanted into reasoning models to elicit an attacker-chosen behavior while their CoT traces appear entirely benign. We find that these CoT-Hidden backdoors can be induced through simple fine-tuning recipes across reasoning-model architectures and sizes. When direct poisoning is ineffective, we introduce a curriculum training approach that progressively teaches the model to produce an attacker-chosen output while concealing the behavior from its reasoning traces. These findings suggest that CoT monitoring may be better framed as a question about the consistency between a model's reasoning trace and its final response than as anomaly detection within a trace. We further examine the mechanisms that allow models to suppress evidence of the target behavior from their reasoning traces. Causal interventions locate a trigger-conditioned activation pathway that does not depend on the visible reasoning, and residual stream verbalizations provide an anomaly warning near answer generation, but do not identify the trigger, target, or backdoor mechanism.
Comments: 15 pages, 2 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.02820 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.02820v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.02820
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Giorgio Severi [view email]
[v1] Mon, 3 Aug 2026 19:32:13 UTC (106 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-08
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.AI
cs.LG
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)