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Evading Chain-of-Thought Monitoring Through Model Poisoning

arXiv Security Archived Aug 05, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.02820v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is an increasingly important component of AI safety stacks but relies on the assumption that a model's reasoning trace is informative about its actions. This work studies the limits of CoT monitoring through the lens of model poisoning. We demonstrate that backdoors can be implanted into reasoning models to elicit an attacker-chosen behavior while their CoT traces appear entirely benign. We find that these CoT-Hidd

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 3 Aug 2026] Evading Chain-of-Thought Monitoring Through Model Poisoning Giorgio Severi, Shujaat Mirza, Blake Bullwinkel, Amanda Minnich Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is an increasingly important component of AI safety stacks but relies on the assumption that a model's reasoning trace is informative about its actions. This work studies the limits of CoT monitoring through the lens of model poisoning. We demonstrate that backdoors can be implanted into reasoning models to elicit an attacker-chosen behavior while their CoT traces appear entirely benign. We find that these CoT-Hidden backdoors can be induced through simple fine-tuning recipes across reasoning-model architectures and sizes. When direct poisoning is ineffective, we introduce a curriculum training approach that progressively teaches the model to produce an attacker-chosen output while concealing the behavior from its reasoning traces. These findings suggest that CoT monitoring may be better framed as a question about the consistency between a model's reasoning trace and its final response than as anomaly detection within a trace. We further examine the mechanisms that allow models to suppress evidence of the target behavior from their reasoning traces. Causal interventions locate a trigger-conditioned activation pathway that does not depend on the visible reasoning, and residual stream verbalizations provide an anomaly warning near answer generation, but do not identify the trigger, target, or backdoor mechanism. Comments: 15 pages, 2 figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2608.02820 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.02820v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.02820 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Giorgio Severi [view email] [v1] Mon, 3 Aug 2026 19:32:13 UTC (106 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 05, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 05, 2026
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