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Privacy-Preserving AI Verification via Minimal Information Disclosure

arXiv Security Archived Aug 05, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.02774v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI verification crosses a trust boundary: a verifier must learn enough to establish an authorized claim, yet the same evidence can reveal sensitive details about the model, workload, or hardware. We introduce minimal information disclosure (MID), which designs and quantifies the information content of verifier-facing evidence itself. MID measures collateral leakage with conditional mutual information: what the release reveals about the protected pr

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 3 Aug 2026] Privacy-Preserving AI Verification via Minimal Information Disclosure Sleem Abdelghafar, Gabriel Kulp AI verification crosses a trust boundary: a verifier must learn enough to establish an authorized claim, yet the same evidence can reveal sensitive details about the model, workload, or hardware. We introduce minimal information disclosure (MID), which designs and quantifies the information content of verifier-facing evidence itself. MID measures collateral leakage with conditional mutual information: what the release reveals about the protected property after the authorized result is known. MID is general by design: it can accommodate different verification goals, protected properties, evidence sources, and deployment constraints. To demonstrate MID's practicality, we evaluate it on four physical measurements and six verification tasks spanning execution type, hardware identity, compute scale, and model identity. These experiments use three mechanism-design variables--the evidence channel, collection policy, and release transformation--but MID is not limited to these choices and can accommodate other deployable mechanisms. Across these tasks, MID produces three releases with perfect held-out verification and zero measured collateral leakage, while the remaining tasks yield explicit privacy--utility frontiers. MID also supports ZKP-certified releases: we demonstrate our proposed linear-projection mechanism using a Groth16 zk-SNARK. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2608.02774 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.02774v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.02774 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Sleem Mahmoud Abdelghafar [view email] [v1] Mon, 3 Aug 2026 18:18:11 UTC (3,360 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 05, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 05, 2026
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