Steganalysis of Adaptive Covert Collusion in Tool-Using Agent Populations: A Black-Box, Cross-Principal Approach
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 05, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.02698v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed not by a single operator but by many, side by side on shared infrastructure. This creates a population-level risk that single-agent safeguards miss: a handful of agents can quietly coordinate, rigging a market, boosting one another in a review process, or timing a joint data grab, while each one looks perfectly well-behaved. The difficulty is that the organisations ru
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 3 Aug 2026]
Steganalysis of Adaptive Covert Collusion in Tool-Using Agent Populations: A Black-Box, Cross-Principal Approach
Mohamed Chahine Ghanem
Tool-using agents built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed not by a single operator but by many, side by side on shared infrastructure. This creates a population-level risk that single-agent safeguards miss: a handful of agents can quietly coordinate, rigging a market, boosting one another in a review process, or timing a joint data grab, while each one looks perfectly well-behaved. The difficulty is that the organisations running these agents cannot see inside one another's models, so any realistic detector must work from behaviour alone: black-box, trace-only, and often with only partial visibility. We treat covert coordination as an information-hiding problem and build a black-box steganalysis detector that combines cross-run mutual-information estimation, permutation tests, distributional-shift statistics, and timing and tool-call side channels, all calibrated to a fixed false-positive budget. Our central move is to stop testing against a single fixed code: we pit the detector against an adversary that continually rewrites its encoding to slip past whatever the detector has learned, and we run this red-versus-blue contest in tool-using, memory-carrying environments rather than toy games. Capacity theory then tells us what to expect, a detection-capacity frontier, a covert bit-rate below which black-box detection is provably no better than chance. We set out an experiment to map this frontier, report clearly labelled placeholder results pending measurement, and flag a practical evasion, spreading a payload across sessions, that current methods largely miss.
Comments: 10 pages
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.02698 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.02698v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.02698
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From: Mohamed Chahine Ghanem Dr [view email]
[v1] Mon, 3 Aug 2026 13:00:25 UTC (112 KB)
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