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Security-First Evaluation of Text-to-Terraform: Benchmarking LLMs and SLMs for Secure IaC Generation

arXiv Security Archived Aug 05, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.02672v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Cloud misconfiguration remains a leading cause of security incidents, yet whether LLMs and SLMs can generate security-compliant Infrastructure-as-Code is an open question. We benchmark seven models, three closed LLMs (Claude Opus 4, GPT-5.4, Gemini 2.5 Pro) and four open SLMs (Qwen2.5-Coder-14B, WizardCoder-33B, CodeLlama-13B, Magicoder-S-CL-7B), on AWS Terraform generation across 17 scenarios, integrating Checkov and Trivy scanners into a GitLab C

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 2 Aug 2026] Security-First Evaluation of Text-to-Terraform: Benchmarking LLMs and SLMs for Secure IaC Generation Francis Luis Santos Vargas, Rodrigo Brandão Mansilha, Diego Kreutz Cloud misconfiguration remains a leading cause of security incidents, yet whether LLMs and SLMs can generate security-compliant Infrastructure-as-Code is an open question. We benchmark seven models, three closed LLMs (Claude Opus 4, GPT-5.4, Gemini 2.5 Pro) and four open SLMs (Qwen2.5-Coder-14B, WizardCoder-33B, CodeLlama-13B, Magicoder-S-CL-7B), on AWS Terraform generation across 17 scenarios, integrating Checkov and Trivy scanners into a GitLab CI/CD pipeline and evaluating two prompt strategies at three security levels (pass@5). Syntactic validity and security compliance are largely orthogonal properties in LLM-generated IaC, a model that reliably produces well-formed Terraform does not necessarily produce secure Terraform: WizardCoder-33B achieves 77.8% validate rate yet zero Checkov compliance, while Claude Opus 4 reaches 23.1% Checkov and 92.5% Trivy pass rates under detailed security prompting. Consequently, prompt engineering alone is insufficient: automated multi-tool scanning remains a necessary complement to LLM-assisted IaC generation regardless of model family or prompt strategy. All artifacts are publicly available. Comments: 10 pages, 1 figure, and 9 tables. The benchmark artifacts and CI/CD pipeline are publicly available at this https URL. Accepted for publication at SBSeg 2026 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Emerging Technologies (cs.ET); Software Engineering (cs.SE) ACM classes: D.2.4; K.6.5; I.2.2 Cite as: arXiv:2608.02672 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.02672v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.02672 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Diego Kreutz [view email] [v1] Sun, 2 Aug 2026 14:45:12 UTC (25 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.ET cs.SE References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 05, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 05, 2026
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