CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning Aug 05, 2026

Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Latent Signals of Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure

arXiv Security Archived Aug 05, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.02657v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic LLMs are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, e.g., malicious side-tasks hidden in external tool results. While many efforts have sought to address the threats, little is known about the internals of agentic LLMs when they are exposed to IPI attacks, a condition which we call IPI exposure. In this paper, we study this problem in depth from three aspects. (1) Probing: Across six models, including the giant 753B-parameter GL

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 1 Aug 2026] Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Latent Signals of Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure Jianshuo Dong, Yiming Liu, Maosen Zhang, Nan Deng, Xu Peng, Xiaoping Zhang, Tianwei Zhang, Jie Zhang, Han Qiu Agentic LLMs are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, e.g., malicious side-tasks hidden in external tool results. While many efforts have sought to address the threats, little is known about the internals of agentic LLMs when they are exposed to IPI attacks, a condition which we call IPI exposure. In this paper, we study this problem in depth from three aspects. (1) Probing: Across six models, including the giant 753B-parameter GLM-5.2, simple linear probes trained on pre-generation hidden states can predict LLMs' IPI exposure. These probes achieve 90%+ AUROC on unseen attacks, agent instructions, and task suites; they exhibit high robustness under adaptive attacks and in cross-lingual settings. (2) Defense: Our CoT measurement reveals a recognition--action gap: though models encode such signals, they often fail to translate them into safe actions. We then introduce AGRI, a probe-gated reasoning-based defense that prepends anti-injection reasoning on demand. On difficult AgentDojo settings, AGRI substantially reduces attack success rate, e.g., from 34.6% to 0% on Qwen3.5-27B, while largely maintaining clean-task utility. (3) Explanation: We introduce an analysis framework that identifies natural-language explanations most strongly correlated with probe-captured signals. The resulting profiles differ across models: latent signals can align with either direct IPI-exposure claims or indirect operational cues. Code is available: this https URL. Comments: Preprint Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2608.02657 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.02657v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.02657 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Jianshuo Dong [view email] [v1] Sat, 1 Aug 2026 12:00:33 UTC (3,646 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 05, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 05, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗