Improving the Security of Containerized Workloads using Transparency and Traceability Services
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 04, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.00660v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Containerized workloads are commonly built via CI/CD pipelines, stored in registries, and executed across heterogeneous infrastructures, including cloud and edge environments. A single compromised build step or credential can turn routine automation into large-scale distribution of malicious artifacts, motivating integrity, transparency, and enforceable deployment-time checks. In this paper, we present an architecture for verifiable container image
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 1 Aug 2026]
Improving the Security of Containerized Workloads using Transparency and Traceability Services
Nikos Fotiou, Lefteris Georgiadis, Ignacio Lacalle, George C. Polyzos, Vasilios A. Siris
Containerized workloads are commonly built via CI/CD pipelines, stored in registries, and executed across heterogeneous infrastructures, including cloud and edge environments. A single compromised build step or credential can turn routine automation into large-scale distribution of malicious artifacts, motivating integrity, transparency, and enforceable deployment-time checks. In this paper, we present an architecture for verifiable container image distribution that addresses key-management challenges and enables policy-enforced admission-time verification. A transparency service generates one-time signing keys bound to authenticated identities, records signing events in an append-only transparency registry, and returns cryptographically verifiable proofs of inclusion. These proofs and identity attributes are attached to image metadata and evaluated by policy-as-code at admission time, so only compliant artifacts are deployed. We implement a proof-of-concept integrated with GitHub Actions and GitLab Runners and evaluate how the resulting pipeline mitigates common supply-chain attacks under a realistic threat model.
Comments: in IEEE CSR 2026
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.00660 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.00660v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.00660
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Submission history
From: Nikos Fotiou [view email]
[v1] Sat, 1 Aug 2026 13:25:44 UTC (109 KB)
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