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Domain Decoupling Attack: Exploiting the Validation Gap Between Protective DNS and Shared Edge Routing

arXiv Security Archived Aug 04, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.00643v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Network attackers often conceal malicious communication within legitimate Internet traffic. Existing CDN-based evasion techniques rely on SNI--Host inconsistency, insufficient domain ownership verification, or provider-specific routing rewrites, which limit their applicability in modern CDN environments. We identify a validation gap in DNS-based authorization, where permission derived from an allowed domain applies to a shared IP and can be reused

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 1 Aug 2026] Domain Decoupling Attack: Exploiting the Validation Gap Between Protective DNS and Shared Edge Routing Weizhe Wang, Minhong Dong, Jinhao Li, Yao Zhang, Hao Liu, Qiang Hu, Tao Luo, Guangquan Xu, Bin Wu Network attackers often conceal malicious communication within legitimate Internet traffic. Existing CDN-based evasion techniques rely on SNI--Host inconsistency, insufficient domain ownership verification, or provider-specific routing rewrites, which limit their applicability in modern CDN environments. We identify a validation gap in DNS-based authorization, where permission derived from an allowed domain applies to a shared IP and can be reused to reach another tenant in both CDN and non-CDN shared-hosting environments. This paper presents the Domain Decoupling Attack (DDA), which resolves an allowed domain to obtain permission for a shared edge IP and subsequently connects to the same address while presenting the hidden domain consistently in both TLS SNI and HTTP Host. Measurements of 1,069,048 domains across six continents produce 18,025,068 successful probes and identify exposure rates of 95.8% overall, 99.26% for CDN domains, 92.75% for non-CDN domains, and 97.7% for non-CDN cross-tenant IPs, while laboratory experiments reveal a structural limitation of DNS-bound access control on shared addresses. These results clarify the security risks of DNS-derived IP authorization and support the evaluation and improvement of access-control mechanisms in CDN and non-CDN shared-hosting environments. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI) Cite as: arXiv:2608.00643 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.00643v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.00643 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Weizhe Wang [view email] [v1] Sat, 1 Aug 2026 12:56:28 UTC (458 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.NI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 04, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 04, 2026
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