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arXiv:2608.00543v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Although semantic watermarking is considered a promising safeguard for images generated by Latent Diffusion Models (LDMs), the reliance of the watermark detection pipeline on neural networks introduces a critical yet underexplored backdoor attack surface. To systematically study this vulnerability, we propose GhostVAE to plant a stealthy backdoor into the encoder of Variational Autoencoder (VAE), enabling reliable evasion of watermark detection. Gh
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 1 Aug 2026]
Robust Watermarks Meet Backdoored Models: Evading Diffusion Semantic Watermarks via Stealthy Backdoor
Jinyuan Liu, Tianshuo Cong, Pei Li, Tianrui Wang, Xinlei He, Anyu Wang, Xiaoyun Wang
Although semantic watermarking is considered a promising safeguard for images generated by Latent Diffusion Models (LDMs), the reliance of the watermark detection pipeline on neural networks introduces a critical yet underexplored backdoor attack surface. To systematically study this vulnerability, we propose GhostVAE to plant a stealthy backdoor into the encoder of Variational Autoencoder (VAE), enabling reliable evasion of watermark detection. GhostVAE operates in two stages: it first constructs a universal trigger via power spectrum regularization to improve the trigger robustness, and then trains a backdoored VAE encoder with a parameter-aligned objective. Through extensive evaluations across three state-of-the-art semantic watermarking schemes and three widely adopted LDMs, we show that GhostVAE preserves watermark detection performance on benign images (achieving an average true positive rate of 94.4%), while simultaneously enabling highly effective evasion under trigger activation (achieving an average attack success rate of 94.6%). Moreover, we comprehensively analyze seventeen representative defenses and demonstrate that GhostVAE remains stealthy across the input space, parameter space, and latent space. Our work fundamentally undermines the trustworthiness of semantic watermarking systems and highlights that secure deployment of semantic watermarks requires end-to-end security considerations, particularly for neural network components.
Comments: To appear in USENIX Security 2026, August 12-14, 2026
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.00543 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.00543v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.00543
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Submission history
From: Tianshuo Cong [view email]
[v1] Sat, 1 Aug 2026 08:58:15 UTC (2,507 KB)
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