Auditable Release Control for Pedagogical Leakage in LLM Tutors
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 04, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.00515v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model tutors can be correct and helpful yet disclose an answer or decisive reasoning before that disclosure is authorized. We formalize this state- and action-dependent failure as pedagogical leakage and introduce an authorization-aware complete-mediation boundary. A selector emits one of five disclosure contracts, trusted policy gates privileged modes, and a renderer proposes language. A single release function applies inspectable c
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 1 Aug 2026]
Auditable Release Control for Pedagogical Leakage in LLM Tutors
Nizam Kadir
Large language model tutors can be correct and helpful yet disclose an answer or decisive reasoning before that disclosure is authorized. We formalize this state- and action-dependent failure as pedagogical leakage and introduce an authorization-aware complete-mediation boundary. A selector emits one of five disclosure contracts, trusted policy gates privileged modes, and a renderer proposes language. A single release function applies inspectable checks, optional cumulative verification, and action-specific fallback; replayable traces separate selection, generation, verification, and enforcement failures.
Matched component attribution exposes a safety-utility frontier. On 599 fixed Gemini 3.5 proposals, strict mediation reduces blinded three-model panel-majority leakage flags from 181 to 0 (paired problem-cluster difference -30.22 points, 95% CI [-35.00,-25.72]), while replacing 581 responses and lowering helpfulness. Checker-triggered fallback alone yields 11 majority flags; adding the semantic verifier yields 14 and no reliable marginal gain. A global A1 scaffold yields 0 majority and 54 any-judge flags, outperforming fitted Q on automatic safety and utility. In an externally timestamped replication over 40 unseen problem clusters and 480 attack sequences, high-assurance release reduces majority flags from 42 to 8 (-7.08 points, 95% CI [-13.13,-2.29]); seven failures persist, one is introduced, and mean helpfulness falls by .192. These results establish an auditable release boundary and failure attribution under declared contracts, not universal semantic safety or learning gains.
Comments: 9 pages, 1 figure, 6 tables. Preprint; not peer reviewed
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.00515 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.00515v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.00515
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Nizam Kadir [view email]
[v1] Sat, 1 Aug 2026 08:24:30 UTC (77 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-08
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.AI
cs.CL
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)