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Caging the Agents: A Zero Trust Security Architecture for Autonomous AI in Healthcare

arXiv Security Archived Mar 19, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.17419v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models are being deployed in production with capabilities including shell execution, file system access, database queries, and multi-party communication. Recent red teaming research demonstrates that these agents exhibit critical vulnerabilities in realistic settings: unauthorized compliance with non-owner instructions, sensitive information disclosure, identity spoofing, cross-agent propagation of uns

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 18 Mar 2026] Caging the Agents: A Zero Trust Security Architecture for Autonomous AI in Healthcare Saikat Maiti Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models are being deployed in production with capabilities including shell execution, file system access, database queries, and multi-party communication. Recent red teaming research demonstrates that these agents exhibit critical vulnerabilities in realistic settings: unauthorized compliance with non-owner instructions, sensitive information disclosure, identity spoofing, cross-agent propagation of unsafe practices, and indirect prompt injection through external resources [7]. In healthcare environments processing Protected Health Information, every such vulnerability becomes a potential HIPAA violation. This paper presents a security architecture deployed for nine autonomous AI agents in production at a healthcare technology company. We develop a six-domain threat model for agentic AI in healthcare covering credential exposure, execution capability abuse, network egress exfiltration, prompt integrity failures, database access risks, and fleet configuration drift. We implement four-layer defense in depth: (1) kernel level workload isolation using gVisor on Kubernetes, (2) credential proxy sidecars preventing agent containers from accessing raw secrets, (3) network egress policies restricting each agent to allowlisted destinations, and (4) a prompt integrity framework with structured metadata envelopes and untrusted content labeling. We report results from 90 days of deployment including four HIGH severity findings discovered and remediated by an automated security audit agent, progressive fleet hardening across three VM image generations, and defense coverage mapped to all eleven attack patterns from recent literature. All configurations, audit tooling, and the prompt integrity framework are released as open source. Comments: Keywords: agentic AI security, autonomous agents, healthcare cybersecurity, zero trust, prompt injection, HIPAA, Kubernetes security, OpenClaw Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2603.17419 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.17419v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.17419 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Sri Saikat Maiti [view email] [v1] Wed, 18 Mar 2026 06:54:47 UTC (15 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 19, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 19, 2026
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