SEAL-Tag: Self-Tag Evidence Aggregation with Probabilistic Circuits for PII-Safe Retrieval-Augmented Generation
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 19, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.17292v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems introduce a critical vulnerability: contextual leakage, where adversaries exploit instruction-following to exfiltrate Personally Identifiable Information (PII) via adaptive extraction. Current defenses force a rigid trade-off between semantic utility and latency. We present SEAL-Tag, a privacy-preserving runtime environment that resolves this via a Verify-then-Route paradigm. SEAL-Tag introduces the SEAL
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 18 Mar 2026]
SEAL-Tag: Self-Tag Evidence Aggregation with Probabilistic Circuits for PII-Safe Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Jin Xie, Songze Li, Guang Cheng
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems introduce a critical vulnerability: contextual leakage, where adversaries exploit instruction-following to exfiltrate Personally Identifiable Information (PII) via adaptive extraction. Current defenses force a rigid trade-off between semantic utility and latency. We present SEAL-Tag, a privacy-preserving runtime environment that resolves this via a Verify-then-Route paradigm. SEAL-Tag introduces the SEAL-Probe protocol, transforming auditing into a structured tool-use operation where the model generates a verifiable PII-Evidence Table (PET) alongside its draft. To adjudicate this evidence, we employ a Probabilistic Circuit (PC) that enforces verifiable logical constraints for robust decision-making. To overcome the privacy "Cold Start" problem, we introduce the S0--S6 Anchored Synthesis Pipeline, generating high-fidelity, provenanced RAG interactions. We pair this with a Two-Stage Curriculum that first optimizes for entity detection before aligning the model to the rigorous audit protocol. Our evaluation demonstrates that SEAL-Tag establishes a new Pareto frontier, reducing adaptive leakage by over 8\times while matching the utility and speed of unsafe baselines.
Comments: 13 pages, 5 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.17292 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.17292v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.17292
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From: Jin Xie [view email]
[v1] Wed, 18 Mar 2026 02:40:54 UTC (199 KB)
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