LAAF: Logic-layer Automated Attack Framework A Systematic Red-Teaming Methodology for LPCI Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Model Systems
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 19, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.17239v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic LLM systems equipped with persistent memory, RAG pipelines, and external tool connectors face a class of attacks - Logic-layer Prompt Control Injection (LPCI) - for which no automated red-teaming instrument existed. We present LAAF (Logic-layer Automated Attack Framework), the first automated red-teaming framework to combine an LPCI-specific technique taxonomy with stage-sequential seed escalation - two capabilities absent from existing too
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 18 Mar 2026]
LAAF: Logic-layer Automated Attack Framework A Systematic Red-Teaming Methodology for LPCI Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Model Systems
Hammad Atta, Ken Huang, Kyriakos Rock Lambros, Yasir Mehmood, Zeeshan Baig, Mohamed Abdur Rahman, Manish Bhatt, M. Aziz Ul Haq, Muhammad Aatif, Nadeem Shahzad, Kamal Noor, Vineeth Sai Narajala, Hazem Ali, Jamel Abed
Agentic LLM systems equipped with persistent memory, RAG pipelines, and external tool connectors face a class of attacks - Logic-layer Prompt Control Injection (LPCI) - for which no automated red-teaming instrument existed. We present LAAF (Logic-layer Automated Attack Framework), the first automated red-teaming framework to combine an LPCI-specific technique taxonomy with stage-sequential seed escalation - two capabilities absent from existing tools: Garak lacks memory-persistence and cross-session triggering; PyRIT supports multi-turn testing but treats turns independently, without seeding each stage from the prior breakthrough. LAAF provides: (i) a 49-technique taxonomy spanning six attack categories (Encoding~11, Structural~8, Semantic~8, Layered~5, Trigger~12, Exfiltration~5; see Table 1), combinable across 5 variants per technique and 6 lifecycle stages, yielding a theoretical maximum of 2,822,400 unique payloads (49 \times 5 \times 1{,}920 \times 6; SHA-256 deduplicated at generation time); and (ii) a Persistent Stage Breaker (PSB) that drives payload mutation stage-by-stage: on each breakthrough, the PSB seeds the next stage with a mutated form of the winning payload, mirroring real adversarial escalation. Evaluation on five production LLM platforms across three independent runs demonstrates that LAAF achieves higher stage-breakthrough efficiency than single-technique random testing, with a mean aggregate breakthrough rate of 84\% (range 83--86\%) and platform-level rates stable within 17 percentage points across runs. Layered combinations and semantic reframing are the highest-effectiveness technique categories, with layered payloads outperforming encoding on well-defended platforms.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.17239 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.17239v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.17239
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From: Muhammad Zeeshan Baig Dr [view email]
[v1] Wed, 18 Mar 2026 00:51:36 UTC (2,063 KB)
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