Detecting Data Poisoning in Code Generation LLMs via Black-Box, Vulnerability-Oriented Scanning
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arXiv:2603.17174v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Code generation large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into modern software development workflows. Recent work has shown that these models are vulnerable to backdoor and poisoning attacks that induce the generation of insecure code, yet effective defenses remain limited. Existing scanning approaches rely on token-level generation consistency to invert attack targets, which is ineffective for source code where identical semantics c
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 17 Mar 2026]
Detecting Data Poisoning in Code Generation LLMs via Black-Box, Vulnerability-Oriented Scanning
Shenao Yan, Shimaa Ahmed, Shan Jin, Sunpreet S. Arora, Yiwei Cai, Yizhen Wang, Yuan Hong
Code generation large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into modern software development workflows. Recent work has shown that these models are vulnerable to backdoor and poisoning attacks that induce the generation of insecure code, yet effective defenses remain limited. Existing scanning approaches rely on token-level generation consistency to invert attack targets, which is ineffective for source code where identical semantics can appear in diverse syntactic forms. We present CodeScan, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first poisoning-scanning framework tailored to code generation models. CodeScan identifies attack targets by analyzing structural similarities across multiple generations conditioned on different clean prompts. It combines iterative divergence analysis with abstract syntax tree (AST)-based normalization to abstract away surface-level variation and unify semantically equivalent code, isolating structures that recur consistently across generations. CodeScan then applies LLM-based vulnerability analysis to determine whether the extracted structures contain security vulnerabilities and flags the model as compromised when such a structure is found. We evaluate CodeScan against four representative attacks under both backdoor and poisoning settings across three real-world vulnerability classes. Experiments on 108 models spanning three architectures and multiple model sizes demonstrate 97%+ detection accuracy with substantially lower false positives than prior methods.
Comments: Preprint
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Software Engineering (cs.SE)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.17174 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.17174v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.17174
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From: Shenao Yan [view email]
[v1] Tue, 17 Mar 2026 22:08:45 UTC (612 KB)
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