CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning

Malicious Or Not: Adding Repository Context to Agent Skill Classification

arXiv Security Archived Mar 18, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.16572v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent skills extend local AI agents, such as Claude Code or Open Claw, with additional functionality, and their popularity has led to the emergence of dedicated skill marketplaces, similar to app stores for mobile applications. Simultaneously, automated skill scanners were introduced, analyzing the skill description available in SKILL.md, to verify their benign behavior. The results for individual market places mark up to 46.8% of skills as malicio

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 17 Mar 2026] Malicious Or Not: Adding Repository Context to Agent Skill Classification Florian Holzbauer, David Schmidt, Gabriel Gegenhuber, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Johanna Ullrich Agent skills extend local AI agents, such as Claude Code or Open Claw, with additional functionality, and their popularity has led to the emergence of dedicated skill marketplaces, similar to app stores for mobile applications. Simultaneously, automated skill scanners were introduced, analyzing the skill description available in this http URL, to verify their benign behavior. The results for individual market places mark up to 46.8% of skills as malicious. In this paper, we present the largest empirical security analysis of the AI agent skill ecosystem, questioning this high classification of malicious skills. Therefore, we collect 238,180 unique skills from three major distribution platforms and GitHub to systematically analyze their type and behavior. This approach substantially reduces the number of skills flagged as non-benign by security scanners to only 0.52% which remain in malicious flagged repositories. Consequently, out methodology substantially reduces false positives and provides a more robust view of the ecosystem's current risk surface. Beyond that, we extend the security analysis from the mere investigation of the skill description to a comparison of its congruence with the GitHub repository the skill is embedded in, providing additional context. Furthermore, our analysis also uncovers several, by now undocumented real-world attack vectors, namely hijacking skills hosted on abandoned GitHub repositories. Comments: 23 Pages, 10 Figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2603.16572 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.16572v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.16572 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Florian Holzbauer [view email] [v1] Tue, 17 Mar 2026 14:27:35 UTC (209 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Archived
    Mar 18, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗