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Poisoning the Pixels: Revisiting Backdoor Attacks on Semantic Segmentation

arXiv Security Archived Mar 18, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.16405v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Semantic segmentation models are widely deployed in safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving, yet their vulnerability to backdoor attacks remains largely underexplored. Prior segmentation backdoor studies transfer threat settings from existing image classification tasks, focusing primarily on object-to-background mis-segmentation. In this work, we revisit the threats by systematically examining backdoor attacks tailored to semantic s

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 17 Mar 2026] Poisoning the Pixels: Revisiting Backdoor Attacks on Semantic Segmentation Guangsheng Zhang, Huan Tian, Leo Zhang, Tianqing Zhu, Ming Ding, Wanlei Zhou, Bo Liu Semantic segmentation models are widely deployed in safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving, yet their vulnerability to backdoor attacks remains largely underexplored. Prior segmentation backdoor studies transfer threat settings from existing image classification tasks, focusing primarily on object-to-background mis-segmentation. In this work, we revisit the threats by systematically examining backdoor attacks tailored to semantic segmentation. We identify four coarse-grained attack vectors (Object-to-Object, Object-to-Background, Background-to-Object, and Background-to-Background attacks), as well as two fine-grained vectors (Instance-Level and Conditional attacks). To formalize these attacks, we introduce BADSEG, a unified framework that optimizes trigger designs and applies label manipulation strategies to maximize attack performance while preserving victim model utility. Extensive experiments across diverse segmentation architectures on benchmark datasets demonstrate that BADSEG achieves high attack effectiveness with minimal impact on clean samples. We further evaluate six representative defenses and find that they fail to reliably mitigate our attacks, revealing critical gaps in current defenses. Finally, we demonstrate that these vulnerabilities persist in recent emerging architectures, including transformer-based networks and the Segment Anything Model (SAM), thereby compromising their security. Our work reveals previously overlooked security vulnerabilities in semantic segmentation, and motivates the development of defenses tailored to segmentation-specific threat models. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2603.16405 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.16405v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.16405 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Guangsheng Zhang [view email] [v1] Tue, 17 Mar 2026 11:42:17 UTC (9,168 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
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    Mar 18, 2026
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