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SseRex: Practical Symbolic Execution of Solana Smart Contracts

arXiv Security Archived Mar 18, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.16349v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Solana is rapidly gaining traction among smart contract developers and users. However, its growing adoption has been accompanied by a series of major security incidents, which have spurred research into automated analysis techniques for Solana smart contracts. Unfortunately, existing approaches do not address the unique and complex account model of Solana. In this paper, we propose SseRex, the first symbolic execution vulnerability detection approa

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 17 Mar 2026] SseRex: Practical Symbolic Execution of Solana Smart Contracts Tobias Cloosters, Pascal Winkler, Jens-Rene Giesen, Ghassan Karame, Lucas Davi Solana is rapidly gaining traction among smart contract developers and users. However, its growing adoption has been accompanied by a series of major security incidents, which have spurred research into automated analysis techniques for Solana smart contracts. Unfortunately, existing approaches do not address the unique and complex account model of Solana. In this paper, we propose SseRex, the first symbolic execution vulnerability detection approach for finding Solana-specific bugs such as missing owner checks, missing signer checks, and missing key checks, as well as arbitrary cross-program invocations. Our evaluation of 8,714 bytecode-only contracts shows that our approach outperforms existing approaches and identifies potential bugs in 467 different contracts. Additionally, we analyzed 120 open-source Solana projects and conducted in-depth case studies on four of them. Our findings reveal that subtle, easily overlooked issues often serve as the root cause of severe exploits, further highlighting the need for specialized analysis tools like SseRex. Comments: This paper appeared on the 23rd Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA '26) in July 2026 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Software Engineering (cs.SE) Cite as: arXiv:2603.16349 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.16349v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.16349 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Pascal Winkler [view email] [v1] Tue, 17 Mar 2026 10:33:11 UTC (403 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.SE References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
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    Mar 18, 2026
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