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Robust Harmful Features Under Jailbreak Attacks: Mechanistic Evidence from Attention Head Specialization in Large Language Models

arXiv Security Archived Jun 29, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.28153v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Jailbreak attacks bypass LLM safety alignment, yet their mechanisms remain poorly understood. We provide evidence that attacks do not comprehensively eliminate safety features, but instead selectively suppress specific attention heads. We identify two functionally differentiated types: Adversarially Compromised Heads (ACHs) concentrated in early layers, which are suppressed under attacks, and Safety-Aligned Heads (SAHs) in mid-layers, which maintai

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 26 Jun 2026] Robust Harmful Features Under Jailbreak Attacks: Mechanistic Evidence from Attention Head Specialization in Large Language Models Yanchen Yin, Dongqi Han, Linghui Li Jailbreak attacks bypass LLM safety alignment, yet their mechanisms remain poorly understood. We provide evidence that attacks do not comprehensively eliminate safety features, but instead selectively suppress specific attention heads. We identify two functionally differentiated types: Adversarially Compromised Heads (ACHs) concentrated in early layers, which are suppressed under attacks, and Safety-Aligned Heads (SAHs) in mid-layers, which maintain robust activations even when attacks succeed. Ablation studies support the causal role of ACHs and the contribution of SAHs to robust activations: suppressing a small number of ACHs is sufficient to induce jailbreak-like behavior on normally refused inputs, while removing SAHs substantially weakens mid-layer safety activations. Token-level attribution further shows that ACH suppression is driven specifically by attack-template tokens, providing a mechanistic account of why attacks can bypass refusal decisions through ACH suppression while leaving internal safety signals sustained by SAHs -- a phenomenon we term Robust Harmful Features. To validate the practical significance of this robustness, we show that simply reading these persistent activations -- without any training -- yields competitive aggregate detection performance with strong adversarial robustness. Comments: 323 pages, 19 figures. Accepted at ICML 2026 as a Oral presentation Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2606.28153 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.28153v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.28153 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Yanchen Yin [view email] [v1] Fri, 26 Jun 2026 14:51:16 UTC (3,731 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 29, 2026
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    Jun 29, 2026
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