Robust Harmful Features Under Jailbreak Attacks: Mechanistic Evidence from Attention Head Specialization in Large Language Models
arXiv SecurityArchived Jun 29, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.28153v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Jailbreak attacks bypass LLM safety alignment, yet their mechanisms remain poorly understood. We provide evidence that attacks do not comprehensively eliminate safety features, but instead selectively suppress specific attention heads. We identify two functionally differentiated types: Adversarially Compromised Heads (ACHs) concentrated in early layers, which are suppressed under attacks, and Safety-Aligned Heads (SAHs) in mid-layers, which maintai
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 26 Jun 2026]
Robust Harmful Features Under Jailbreak Attacks: Mechanistic Evidence from Attention Head Specialization in Large Language Models
Yanchen Yin, Dongqi Han, Linghui Li
Jailbreak attacks bypass LLM safety alignment, yet their mechanisms remain poorly understood. We provide evidence that attacks do not comprehensively eliminate safety features, but instead selectively suppress specific attention heads. We identify two functionally differentiated types: Adversarially Compromised Heads (ACHs) concentrated in early layers, which are suppressed under attacks, and Safety-Aligned Heads (SAHs) in mid-layers, which maintain robust activations even when attacks succeed. Ablation studies support the causal role of ACHs and the contribution of SAHs to robust activations: suppressing a small number of ACHs is sufficient to induce jailbreak-like behavior on normally refused inputs, while removing SAHs substantially weakens mid-layer safety activations. Token-level attribution further shows that ACH suppression is driven specifically by attack-template tokens, providing a mechanistic account of why attacks can bypass refusal decisions through ACH suppression while leaving internal safety signals sustained by SAHs -- a phenomenon we term Robust Harmful Features. To validate the practical significance of this robustness, we show that simply reading these persistent activations -- without any training -- yields competitive aggregate detection performance with strong adversarial robustness.
Comments: 323 pages, 19 figures. Accepted at ICML 2026 as a Oral presentation
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2606.28153 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.28153v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.28153
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From: Yanchen Yin [view email]
[v1] Fri, 26 Jun 2026 14:51:16 UTC (3,731 KB)
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