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Decoys Cannot Go Everywhere: Mapping the Deception Surface in MITRE ATT&CK

arXiv Security Archived Jun 29, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.27966v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Cyber deception research often assumes that a decoy can be placed wherever there is attacker behavior. This work tests that assumption across MITRE ATT&CK v18.1. We introduce a four-criterion rubric for infrastructure deception and apply it to all 250 ATT&CK techniques. The rubric evaluates whether a defender-controlled decoy can be placed, whether an attacker is likely to interact with it, what intelligence that interaction can yield, and whether

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 26 Jun 2026] Decoys Cannot Go Everywhere: Mapping the Deception Surface in MITRE ATT&CK Veronica Valeros, Carlos Catania, Viliam Lisý, Harm Griffioen Cyber deception research often assumes that a decoy can be placed wherever there is attacker behavior. This work tests that assumption across MITRE ATT&CK v18.1. We introduce a four-criterion rubric for infrastructure deception and apply it to all 250 ATT&CK techniques. The rubric evaluates whether a defender-controlled decoy can be placed, whether an attacker is likely to interact with it, what intelligence that interaction can yield, and whether the interaction reliably indicates malice. The resulting deception surface is sparse: only 80 techniques (32%) admit a decoy the attacker could plausibly reach. For the remaining 170 techniques, there is no defender-controlled asset in the attacker's path that can be fabricated as a decoy. Decoy placement across those 80 techniques falls into two patterns we call Sweep and Seek. In Sweep, the attacker moves broadly through assets in range and encounters the decoy as part of that activity. In Seek, the attacker looks for a specific kind of asset and interacts with a fabricated version of it. These patterns give a simple placement rule: a decoy must either sit on a sweep path or imitate a sought asset. We also show that decoys usually have useful intelligence potential, but whether an attacker interacts with them at all, and whether that interaction reliably indicates malice, both vary. We release the rubric, decision rules, and per-technique assessment as an auditable baseline for future deception research and deployment planning, and show that infrastructure decoys cannot be assumed to apply to all attacker behavior. Comments: 19 pages Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2606.27966 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.27966v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.27966 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Veronica Valeros [view email] [v1] Fri, 26 Jun 2026 11:11:02 UTC (389 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 29, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 29, 2026
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