Exploring and Exploiting Synchrony Limitations of Time-Triggered Network-Agnostic Guardians
arXiv SecurityArchived Jun 29, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.27819v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Time-triggered communication protocols rely on trusted components known as guardians to enforce adherence to predetermined network schedules. Network-agnostic guardians offer an efficient and scalable distributed solution with reduced implementation cost and complexity compared to network-aware alternatives. However, this efficiency is based on the guardian's dependence on the controlled node for clock synchronization, which introduces a vulnerabil
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 26 Jun 2026]
Exploring and Exploiting Synchrony Limitations of Time-Triggered Network-Agnostic Guardians
Shreya Vithal Kulhalli, Mohammad Ibrahim Alkoudsi, Gerhard Fohler
Time-triggered communication protocols rely on trusted components known as guardians to enforce adherence to predetermined network schedules. Network-agnostic guardians offer an efficient and scalable distributed solution with reduced implementation cost and complexity compared to network-aware alternatives. However, this efficiency is based on the guardian's dependence on the controlled node for clock synchronization, which introduces a vulnerability: a malicious node can exploit this dependency to launch timing attacks against its guardian and eventually interfere with messages from other nodes on the network. In this paper, we establish a theoretical lower bound on the attainable clock synchronization precision between a node and its network-agnostic guardian. Building on this result, we introduce a timing attack that leverages the unavoidably imperfect clock synchrony to cause controlled and undetected de-synchronization of the guardian. The attack enables a malicious node to cause collisions with targeted critical network messages. We evaluate the effectiveness of the attack using a FlexRay field bus network model implemented in the OMNeT++ simulation framework. Our results show that the attack is able to remain undetected with 100% success and disrupts the transmission of the critical messages of the target node by causing collisions with them with 100% success.
Comments: Presented at the "29th International Symposium on Real-Time Distributed Computing" ISORC 2026
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC)
Cite as: arXiv:2606.27819 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.27819v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.27819
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Shreya Vithal Kulhalli [view email]
[v1] Fri, 26 Jun 2026 08:00:44 UTC (271 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-06
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.DC
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)