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Radical AI Interpretability

arXiv AI Archived Jun 26, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.26523v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We develop a framework for interpreting AI systems as agents, drawing on the philosophical tradition of radical interpretation and the tools of mechanistic interpretability. The core question is: given the computational facts about a system, how do we solve for its beliefs, desires, and meanings? This matters increasingly for safety. We want to be able to trust the systems we deploy, whether by understanding their goals or, more modestly, by reliab

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    Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence [Submitted on 25 Jun 2026] Radical AI Interpretability Daniel A. Herrmann, Benjamin A. Levinstein We develop a framework for interpreting AI systems as agents, drawing on the philosophical tradition of radical interpretation and the tools of mechanistic interpretability. The core question is: given the computational facts about a system, how do we solve for its beliefs, desires, and meanings? This matters increasingly for safety. We want to be able to trust the systems we deploy, whether by understanding their goals or, more modestly, by reliably detecting deception. Interpretability researchers are building tools to read beliefs and desires off a model's internals, but there is no settled account of when such a tool has succeeded. This book supplies one. We propose criteria on both representationalist and interpretationist approaches, and tie each to tests current interpretability methods can carry out. A central lesson is that these attributions cannot be made piecemeal. Beliefs, desires, and the propositional structure they presuppose are jointly constrained, and a method that fixes one while measuring the others inherits whatever distortions that introduces. This holism becomes pressing for AI systems, which may not share the interpreter's concepts. However, it also provides leverage: a system's attitudes constrain its propositional structure, that structure constrains which attitudes can be attributed, and mechanistic interpretability can help us measure both. Comments: Draft of manuscript to appear as Cambridge Element in the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2606.26523 [cs.AI]   (or arXiv:2606.26523v1 [cs.AI] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.26523 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Benjamin Levinstein [view email] [v1] Thu, 25 Jun 2026 01:58:38 UTC (104 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.AI < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv AI
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 26, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 26, 2026
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