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Agents That Know Too Much: A Data-Centric Survey of Privacy in LLM Agents

arXiv Security Archived Jun 26, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.26627v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model agents increasingly query databases, search document collections, call external APIs, remember past interactions, and act on a user's behalf. As they move from answering questions to operating over sensitive data, privacy becomes harder to enforce. An agent touches many data sources, runs multi-step workflows, keeps state across sessions, and acts with delegated permissions. Sensitive information can therefore leak not only thr

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 25 Jun 2026] Agents That Know Too Much: A Data-Centric Survey of Privacy in LLM Agents Nada Lahjouji, Ashwin Gerard Colaco Large language model agents increasingly query databases, search document collections, call external APIs, remember past interactions, and act on a user's behalf. As they move from answering questions to operating over sensitive data, privacy becomes harder to enforce. An agent touches many data sources, runs multi-step workflows, keeps state across sessions, and acts with delegated permissions. Sensitive information can therefore leak not only through its final answer but through the queries it issues, the intermediate results it handles, the memory it writes, and the messages it exchanges with other agents. We survey the privacy of LLM agents from a data-centric view, organizing the field around the data an agent touches rather than by attack type, and we use data agent as shorthand for an LLM agent that works with data. Research on these risks is active but scattered across retrieval-augmented generation, text-to-SQL interfaces, agent memory, prompt injection, access control, and contextual privacy. This survey brings that work together: we taxonomize the data sources an agent touches, the privacy risks each source creates, and the governance mechanisms that address them; we map the benchmarks used to measure these risks and identify what is missing; and we set out the open problems. Two findings recur: among governance mechanisms only information-flow control covers both compositional and cross-session inference leakage, the two least-protected risks; and no benchmark drives an agent across its data surfaces under one privacy policy, the instrument the field most lacks. Our goal is a reference that situates the scattered literature and gives future work a common framing. Comments: 17 pages, 4 figures, 7 tables Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2606.26627 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.26627v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.26627 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Nada Lahjouji [view email] [v1] Thu, 25 Jun 2026 05:44:18 UTC (62 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 26, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 26, 2026
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