Beyond Takedown: Measuring Malicious Go Module Persistence in the Wild
arXiv SecurityArchived Jun 26, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.26291v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We measure an automation-based supply chain campaign in the Go ecosystem. The attackers repackage legitimate Go modules under attacker-controlled owners, and embed them with obfuscated code for an import-triggered downloader. Our results come from two complementary analyses: a) a manual search on GitHub across 2,113 repositories and b) a large-scale scan of 12.3M index entries using a deobfuscating AST scanner (GOAST) that we implemented. As a resu
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 24 Jun 2026]
Beyond Takedown: Measuring Malicious Go Module Persistence in the Wild
Minjae Bae, Carter Yagemann
We measure an automation-based supply chain campaign in the Go ecosystem. The attackers repackage legitimate Go modules under attacker-controlled owners, and embed them with obfuscated code for an import-triggered downloader. Our results come from two complementary analyses: a) a manual search on GitHub across 2,113 repositories and b) a large-scale scan of 12.3M index entries using a deobfuscating AST scanner (GOAST) that we implemented. As a result, we identified 2,289 malicious versions of legitimate Go modules. We demonstrate that purely GitHub-centric searches fail to identify the full extent of the compromise and are only effective for as long as the affected code is present on the platform. Moreover, our proxy-based measurements of the takedown-remediation gap reveal that among artifacts later found to be GitHub-unobservable (i.e., removed or suspended), at least 99.4% remained retrievable via Go proxy. Following our disclosure, GitHub has removed 684 malicious repositories and the Google Go team has remediated 1,377 module versions.
Comments: 22 pages, 4 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2606.26291 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.26291v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.26291
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Submission history
From: Carter Yagemann [view email]
[v1] Wed, 24 Jun 2026 18:36:38 UTC (314 KB)
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