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Beyond Takedown: Measuring Malicious Go Module Persistence in the Wild

arXiv Security Archived Jun 26, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.26291v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We measure an automation-based supply chain campaign in the Go ecosystem. The attackers repackage legitimate Go modules under attacker-controlled owners, and embed them with obfuscated code for an import-triggered downloader. Our results come from two complementary analyses: a) a manual search on GitHub across 2,113 repositories and b) a large-scale scan of 12.3M index entries using a deobfuscating AST scanner (GOAST) that we implemented. As a resu

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 24 Jun 2026] Beyond Takedown: Measuring Malicious Go Module Persistence in the Wild Minjae Bae, Carter Yagemann We measure an automation-based supply chain campaign in the Go ecosystem. The attackers repackage legitimate Go modules under attacker-controlled owners, and embed them with obfuscated code for an import-triggered downloader. Our results come from two complementary analyses: a) a manual search on GitHub across 2,113 repositories and b) a large-scale scan of 12.3M index entries using a deobfuscating AST scanner (GOAST) that we implemented. As a result, we identified 2,289 malicious versions of legitimate Go modules. We demonstrate that purely GitHub-centric searches fail to identify the full extent of the compromise and are only effective for as long as the affected code is present on the platform. Moreover, our proxy-based measurements of the takedown-remediation gap reveal that among artifacts later found to be GitHub-unobservable (i.e., removed or suspended), at least 99.4% remained retrievable via Go proxy. Following our disclosure, GitHub has removed 684 malicious repositories and the Google Go team has remediated 1,377 module versions. Comments: 22 pages, 4 figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2606.26291 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.26291v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.26291 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Carter Yagemann [view email] [v1] Wed, 24 Jun 2026 18:36:38 UTC (314 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 26, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 26, 2026
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