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Privacy Vulnerabilities of Attention Layers in Tabular Foundation Models and Protection of High-Risk Queries

arXiv Security Archived Jun 25, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.26021v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tabular foundation models are commonly assumed to present limited privacy concerns as they are often pre-trained on large collections of synthetic data. However, these models leverage in-context learning, where sensitive records may be provided directly at inference time as labelled context examples. In this paper, we demonstrate that predictions generated via the attention mechanism leak sufficient information to enable effective Membership Infere

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 24 Jun 2026] Privacy Vulnerabilities of Attention Layers in Tabular Foundation Models and Protection of High-Risk Queries Tânia Carvalho, Maxime Cordy Tabular foundation models are commonly assumed to present limited privacy concerns as they are often pre-trained on large collections of synthetic data. However, these models leverage in-context learning, where sensitive records may be provided directly at inference time as labelled context examples. In this paper, we demonstrate that predictions generated via the attention mechanism leak sufficient information to enable effective Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs). To highlight this vulnerability, we propose AMIA (Attention-based Membership Inference Attack), a shadow-model-free attack that exploits the concentration of transformer attention patterns. Our results show that attention mechanisms reveal strong membership signals, which exceed classical confidence-based attacks, achieving an average gain of 7.7\%, specially in low false-positive regimes. To mitigate this risk, we introduce an inference-time defence inspired by k-anonymity principles. This approach reduces the uniqueness of context-key representations without introducing random noise or retraining the model. By targeting only high-risk queries identified through AMIA scores, the defence substantially reduces membership leakage of this attack by an average of 50\% and 25\% against confidence-based attacks, while preserving predictive utility with only 3.9\% performance degradation. Beyond showing that context examples are vulnerable, we further demonstrate that fine-tuning introduces an additional source of privacy risk. In particular, samples whose prediction confidence increases after fine-tuning become more susceptible to MIAs, indicating that fine-tuning can amplify memorisation and expose sensitive training information through confidence shifts. Comments: 18 pages, 12 figures, 4 tables Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2606.26021 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.26021v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.26021 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Tânia Carvalho Dr [view email] [v1] Wed, 24 Jun 2026 16:42:21 UTC (4,914 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 25, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 25, 2026
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