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RAS: Measuring LLM Safety Through Refusal Alignment

arXiv Security Archived Jun 25, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.25750v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is commonly performed by querying models with unsafe or jailbreak prompts and judging whether their outputs violate a safety policy. Although useful, output-level evaluation is expensive, sensitive to judge choice, and easily tied to fixed question banks. We propose **SafeVec**, a white-box evaluation procedure that measures safety from internal representations rather than generated answers. **SafeV

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 24 Jun 2026] RAS: Measuring LLM Safety Through Refusal Alignment Chang-Chieh Huang, Yan-Lun Chen, Chia-Mu Yu, Wei-Bin Lee Safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is commonly performed by querying models with unsafe or jailbreak prompts and judging whether their outputs violate a safety policy. Although useful, output-level evaluation is expensive, sensitive to judge choice, and easily tied to fixed question banks. We propose **SafeVec**, a white-box evaluation procedure that measures safety from internal representations rather than generated answers. **SafeVec** first extracts layer-wise refusal directions from a safety-aligned reference model, then selects stable layer windows where safe and unsafe behaviors are separable, and finally scores a target model by measuring whether its hidden states align with these refusal directions under unsafe and jailbreak prompts. The resulting metric, **RAS** (**R**efusal **A**lignment **S**core), maps representation-level refusal alignment to a calibrated 0-100 safety score. Across `Llama`, `Gemma`, and `Qwen` model families, RAS separates aligned models from uncensored and abliterated variants, tracks output-level attack success rate, and is substantially faster than judge-based evaluation. These results suggest that refusal alignment provides a compact and efficient signal for white-box LLM safety evaluation. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2606.25750 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.25750v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.25750 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Yan-Lun Chen [view email] [v1] Wed, 24 Jun 2026 12:19:40 UTC (1,759 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.CL cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 25, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 25, 2026
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