Leader Rotation Is Not Enough: Scrutinizing Leadership Democracy of Chained BFT Consensus
arXiv SecurityArchived Jun 24, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2501.02970v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: With the growing popularity of blockchains, modern chained BFT protocols combining chaining and leader rotation to obtain better efficiency and leadership democracy have received increasing interest. Although the efficiency provisions of chained BFT protocols have been thoroughly analyzed, the leadership democracy has received little attention in prior work. In this paper, we scrutinize the leadership democracy of four representative chained BF
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 6 Jan 2025 (v1), last revised 23 Jun 2026 (this version, v2)]
Leader Rotation Is Not Enough: Scrutinizing Leadership Democracy of Chained BFT Consensus
Jianyu Niu, Yining Tang, Runchao Han, Chen Feng, Yinqian Zhang
With the growing popularity of blockchains, modern chained BFT protocols combining chaining and leader rotation to obtain better efficiency and leadership democracy have received increasing interest. Although the efficiency provisions of chained BFT protocols have been thoroughly analyzed, the leadership democracy has received little attention in prior work. In this paper, we scrutinize the leadership democracy of four representative chained BFT protocols, especially under attack. To this end, we propose a unified framework with two evaluation metrics, i.e., chain quality and censorship resilience, and quantitatively analyze chosen protocols through the Markov Decision Process (MDP). With this framework, we further examine the impact of two key components, i.e., voting pattern and leader rotation on leadership democracy. Our results indicate that leader rotation is not enough to provide the leadership democracy guarantee; an adversary could utilize the design, e.g., voting pattern, to deteriorate the leadership democracy significantly. Based on the analysis results, we propose customized countermeasures for three evaluated protocols to improve their leadership democracy with only slight protocol overhead and no change of consensus rules. We also discuss future directions toward building more democratic chained BFT protocols.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC)
Cite as: arXiv:2501.02970 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2501.02970v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2501.02970
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Submission history
From: Yining Tang [view email]
[v1] Mon, 6 Jan 2025 12:27:34 UTC (347 KB)
[v2] Tue, 23 Jun 2026 08:30:37 UTC (2,254 KB)
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