Exit-and-Join Dynamics for Decentralized Coalition Formation
arXiv AIArchived Jun 19, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.19683v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This paper studies coalition formation as a decentralized dynamical process driven by unilateral exit-and-join decisions. Agents evaluate local moves using the Aumann-Dreze value, so payoffs are computed within the agent's current coalition rather than through a globally negotiated coalition structure. The resulting model links cooperative payoff allocation with noncooperative best-response behavior: a terminal partition is precisely a coalition st
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Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
[Submitted on 18 Jun 2026]
Exit-and-Join Dynamics for Decentralized Coalition Formation
Quanyan Zhu
This paper studies coalition formation as a decentralized dynamical process driven by unilateral exit-and-join decisions. Agents evaluate local moves using the Aumann-Dreze value, so payoffs are computed within the agent's current coalition rather than through a globally negotiated coalition structure. The resulting model links cooperative payoff allocation with noncooperative best-response behavior: a terminal partition is precisely a coalition structure with no admissible, individually profitable exit-and-join deviation. We establish equilibrium characterizations, identify conditions under which the dynamics admit scalar Lyapunov or exact-potential representations, and analyze how switching and acceptance costs shape local stability. Numerical experiments test finite-time stabilization, cost sensitivity, and a special convex-game benchmark.
Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Systems and Control (eess.SY)
MSC classes: 91A12, 91A43, 68T05, 91D30
ACM classes: I.2.11; I.2.6; J.4
Cite as: arXiv:2606.19683 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2606.19683v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.19683
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From: Quanyan Zhu [view email]
[v1] Thu, 18 Jun 2026 01:19:31 UTC (76 KB)
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