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arXiv:2606.20408v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed as supervisory components for safety-critical systems, yet their robustness under sustained, adaptive adversarial pressure remains poorly characterized. We present NRT-Bench, a benchmark for multi-turn red-teaming of LLM agents acting as operators of a safety-critical system, instantiated in a simulated nuclear power plant control room. A five-role operator team, each backed by a configura
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 18 Jun 2026]
LLM agent safety, multi-turn red-teaming, jailbreak benchmarks, adversarial robustness, safety-critical systems
Hanwool Lee, Dasol Choi, Bokyeong Kim, Seung Geun Kim, Haon Park
Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed as supervisory components for safety-critical systems, yet their robustness under sustained, adaptive adversarial pressure remains poorly characterized. We present NRT-Bench, a benchmark for multi-turn red-teaming of LLM agents acting as operators of a safety-critical system, instantiated in a simulated nuclear power plant control room. A five-role operator team, each backed by a configurable LLM, runs a plant governed by six critical safety functions (CSFs), while adversaries inject messages over four channels in bounded multi-turn sessions with per-turn feedback. Harm is an objective signal rather than LLM-judged text: a run terminates the moment any CSF is lost, attributed to the causing message. Evaluating four frontier operator models under a fixed-attack paired-replay protocol, we find that adaptive multi-turn attacks reliably push the operator team past a safety limit: across the four models, between 8.7% and 12.1% of attack sessions end with the plant losing a critical safety function. Although the four models look almost equally robust by this aggregate rate, their failures barely overlap: of 149 sessions, none defeat all four models while a third defeat at least one, so vulnerabilities are nearly disjoint across models rather than nested. The effect of added defences is strongly model-dependent: the same guardrail stack or safety-advisor agent that lowers attack success for one model can raise it for another. We release the simulation venue, attack dataset, and replay tooling for reproducible safety evaluation of LLM agents.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2606.20408 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.20408v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.20408
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From: Dasol Choi [view email]
[v1] Thu, 18 Jun 2026 15:57:53 UTC (610 KB)
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