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GNSS Spoofing Threat for V2X communications

arXiv Security Archived Jun 19, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.20215v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) constitute a core technology for delivering crucial positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services in the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) domain, where they are indispensable for generating Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAM) that uphold network reliability and vehicular safety. Yet, GNSS signals are acutely exposed to spoofing, an advanced attack in which an adversary transmits crafted signals that repli

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 18 Jun 2026] GNSS Spoofing Threat for V2X communications Adolfo P. Jimenez, Juan Arquero-Gallego, Mario P. Luna, Jose E. Naranjo, Felipe Jimenez Alonso Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) constitute a core technology for delivering crucial positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services in the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) domain, where they are indispensable for generating Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAM) that uphold network reliability and vehicular safety. Yet, GNSS signals are acutely exposed to spoofing, an advanced attack in which an adversary transmits crafted signals that replicate legitimate satellite characteristics, misleading the receiver into computing a false position. This work presents a methodology for conducting physical spoofing with inexpensive Software Defined Radio (SDR), describing a coordinate generation pipeline that employs Haversine-based distance calculations, temporal discretization to emulate constant velocity, and linear interpolation to produce high-fidelity GPS baseband signals. The proposed attack is experimentally validated on real Commsignia OnBoard Unit (OBU) and RoadSide Unit (RSU) devices using a HackRF One across three scenarios that emulate synthetic trajectories at steady speeds of 90 km/h, 145 km/h, and 200 km/h. The most significant contribution of this paper is the demonstration that V2X communications are not secured, as they are susceptible to GNSS spoofing attacks, which cause service degradation without being detected. Comments: 2026 IEEE\@. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2606.20215 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.20215v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.20215 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Juan Arquero Gallego Mr. [view email] [v1] Thu, 18 Jun 2026 13:30:04 UTC (1,773 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 19, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 19, 2026
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