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A Measurement Study of Cryptographic Misuse in Embodied AI Mobile Applications

arXiv Security Archived Jun 19, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.19983v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Embodied AI (EAI) mobile applications are evolving from auxiliary user interfaces into active control-path components, directly linking mobile-side cryptographic security to cyber-physical trust. Despite this shift, existing security research predominantly focuses on embodied AI devices and cloud infrastructures, leaving the mobile control layer largely unexplored as a critical attack surface. To bridge this gap, we present the first large-scale me

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 18 Jun 2026] A Measurement Study of Cryptographic Misuse in Embodied AI Mobile Applications Junchao Li, Xuelei Wang, Yuhang Huang, Qi Wang, Boyang Ma, Xuelong Dai, Minghui Xu, Yue Zhang Embodied AI (EAI) mobile applications are evolving from auxiliary user interfaces into active control-path components, directly linking mobile-side cryptographic security to cyber-physical trust. Despite this shift, existing security research predominantly focuses on embodied AI devices and cloud infrastructures, leaving the mobile control layer largely unexplored as a critical attack surface. To bridge this gap, we present the first large-scale measurement study of cryptographic misuse within the EAI mobile ecosystem. We construct EAIAppZoo, a benchmark of 507 real-world applications across six EAI domains, and employ an automated semantic-aware analysis pipeline to measure the prevalence and characteristics of five major cryptographic failure modes. Our measurement yields 12,975 misuse findings (with an evaluated precision of 80.74\%), revealing that these cryptographic failures are driven by EAI-specific engineering constraints rather than random developer errors. We uncover structural security trade-offs: latency-sensitive control paths systematically weaken transport protection, while the heavy reliance on offline device provisioning and legacy IoT SDKs exacerbates the local hardcoding of authentication credentials. Through real-world case studies, we demonstrate how these mobile-side cryptographic flaws bypass nominal network protections, enabling adversaries to intercept command channels and hijack the physical control of EAI entities. Ultimately, our findings highlight that mobile applications have become a fragile, yet overlooked, cryptographic trust boundary in cyber-physical systems. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2606.19983 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.19983v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.19983 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Junchao Li [view email] [v1] Thu, 18 Jun 2026 09:24:22 UTC (1,339 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 19, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 19, 2026
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