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Heterogeneous LLM Debate Under Adversarial Peers: Honest Gains, Replacement Costs, and Resilience

arXiv Security Archived Jun 19, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.19826v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Heterogeneous LLM debate is motivated by the promise that diverse peers correct one another, but the same exchange that carries correction also carries adversarial influence. We measure which dominates by tracking how a heterogeneous peer changes the honest agents' revision behavior: how often they change their answer, and whether the change is corrective or harmful. We compare matched panels (homogeneous baseline, honest-mixed, and adversarial-mix

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 18 Jun 2026] Heterogeneous LLM Debate Under Adversarial Peers: Honest Gains, Replacement Costs, and Resilience Prashanti Nilayam, Kiran Kumar Ramanna, Prashil Tumbade, Sankalp Nayak Heterogeneous LLM debate is motivated by the promise that diverse peers correct one another, but the same exchange that carries correction also carries adversarial influence. We measure which dominates by tracking how a heterogeneous peer changes the honest agents' revision behavior: how often they change their answer, and whether the change is corrective or harmful. We compare matched panels (homogeneous baseline, honest-mixed, and adversarial-mixed) and contaminated panels in which a malicious same-family peer is already present, spanning four model families and three reasoning benchmarks. An honest heterogeneous peer sharply lowers harmful revision, and an adversarial one reverses it. For Llama-3.1-70B defenders on MATH-hard, the honest-slot harmful-revision rate falls from 89% in the homogeneous panel to 35% with an honest peer, and an adversarial peer returns it to 90%. The conditional rate hides this damage on weak defenders, but the end-of-debate flip rate exposes it. The pattern keeps its sign across families and benchmarks while its magnitude varies with the defender-benchmark regime. We also measure the effects when an adversarial same-family peer is already present: an honest heterogeneous peer lowers both harmful revision and the rate at which initially-correct answers are lost. On the same Llama-3.1-70B setting, the added honest peer cuts the flip rate on initially-correct items from 31% under a same-family adversary to 6%. Heterogeneity is therefore not only an attack surface but, when an adversary is already present, also a defense. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) Cite as: arXiv:2606.19826 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.19826v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.19826 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Prashanti Nilayam [view email] [v1] Thu, 18 Jun 2026 06:06:28 UTC (58 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.MA References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 19, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 19, 2026
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